Location, Location, Location: Jurisdiction and Enforcement in the Land where Location Does Not Exist

Introduction

Legal dramas often focus on the climax of courtroom arguments and verdicts. In doing so, they gloss over crucial aspects of the legal process: determining the appropriate jurisdiction for a claim, and the subsequent enforcement of a judgment or award.

Determining jurisdiction takes place at the start of every claim. It is the process of deciding which court or adjudicatory body has authority to decide a particular legal claim. This determination can play a fundamental role in whether justice is achieved. Determining jurisdiction is not always easy, however. Indeed, it can be an extraordinarily complex question, and there may be no clear right answer.

Enforcement occurs at the end of a claim. It involves the practical application and execution of a court’s ruling or judgment, whereby the successful party can monetise the judgment.

The two key questions of where to file a lawsuit and how to effectively enforce a judgment are at the forefront of every practitioner’s mind. The unique characteristics of cryptoassets, including decentralised control and often pseudonymous ownership, mean that significant challenges can arise in answering these questions. Addressing such challenges is the focus of this article.

Are cryptoassets property?

Cryptoassets have become a distinct category of digital asset. They primarily use blockchain technology—a decentralised ledger system—and record transactions over a software network of participants and network-instantiated data (ie, data that comes into existence through interactions within a network, rather than being pre-existing), providing security and anonymity. Cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin and Ethereum are the most well-known forms of cryptoasset. They operate across borders and are independent of central banks. The scope of cryptoassets extends to other assets such as ‘utility tokens’, which provide access to services, and ‘security tokens’, which represent stakes in assets or ventures, such as a company.

English law’s classification of cryptoassets is nuanced. Traditional English legal thinking divides property into ‘things in possession’ (tangible objects), and ‘things in action’ (the enforceable rights associated with the property). Cryptoassets such as non-fungible tokens (NFTs) challenge this binary classification. They lack the physicality of ‘things in possession’ and do not give rise to the typical enforceable claims or rights of ‘things in action’. The UK Jurisdiction Taskforce—a body established by the UK Government, the Judiciary, and the Law Society to promote the use of technology in the UK’s legal sector—has therefore proposed a third category that treats cryptoassets as a novel form of property. This classification is consistent with the standards set out in the landmark National Provincial Bank v Ainsworth [1965] AC 1175 case, which require that property be definable, identifiable, transferable to third parties, and have a certain degree of permanence or stability.

Despite their intangible nature and volatility in value, cryptoassets generally meet the National Provincial Bank criteria. This is reflected in the pragmatic approach that the English courts have taken. For example, in AA v Persons Unknown & Ors, Re Bitcoin [2019] EWHC 3556 (Comm), an insurance company that was the victim of a ransomware attack and was forced to pay the ransom in Bitcoin applied for a ransom injunction. The English court granted the injunction, recognising Bitcoin, for the purposes of the injunction, as property that can be protected by law.

While cryptoassets do not meet traditional definitions of ‘things in possession’ or ‘things in action’, their recognition as a potentially new form of property signals broader legal and conceptual acceptance. AA v Persons Unknown set a precedent in UK law for treating crypto-currencies as property, opening the way for legal protection and enforceability of crypto-currencies in disputes over theft, fraud, and other legal actions. Unsurprisingly, English courts have followed this trend, repeatedly citing AA v Persons Unknown and orienting the common law towards the needs of the modern digital world—going as far as allowing new claims to be served via NFTs. The fact that the English law on the nature of decentralised networks is rapidly evolving is also demonstrated by the pending Tulip Trading Ltd v van der Laan [2023] EWCA Civ 83, where one of the main questions in dispute is whether certain networks are sufficiently decentralised that the programmers who created, updated, and ultimately developed them could be deemed to have a duty towards those who had assets on those networks. The answer to this question has significant ramifications, including the creation of a potential fiduciary duty owed by developers to Bitcoin owners.

Rights relating to property under English law

English law recognises two sets of rights in relation to assets: rights in personam, and rights in rem. Rights in personam, or personal rights, are specific rights that exist between particular individuals. For example, if a person enters into a contract with another person, a personal obligation arises to perform that contract. This obligation is a right in personam for each person that enters into the contract, is enforceable against the other, and generally cannot be enforced against anyone other than the parties involved. In contrast, a right in rem extends beyond the parties involved. A common example is the ownership of a piece of property. The right in rem means that if someone trespasses on your property, you can enforce your property rights against them, regardless of whether you have any personal legal relationship with them.

Whether a right is a right in personam or a right in rem is critical in determining jurisdiction over that right. Jurisdiction over in personam rights depends on connecting factors between the claimant and the defendant, the cause of action, venue, and the consent of the defendant. In contrast, jurisdiction over in rem rights depends on whether the property in question is within the jurisdiction of the court. This distinction highlights the importance of having practical control over an asset—a concept that has become increasingly complex in the cryptoasset space due to its intangible and decentralised nature, as explored in more detail below.

Establishing jurisdiction through connecting factors

Traditional legal systems governing assets are often based on geographical boundaries and physical presence. Private international law usually adopts the principles of lex loci (the law where the property is located) and the forum situs (the jurisdiction where the property is located) to regulate the jurisdiction of property and the applicable law. This is simple for real property (eg, land) and generally applies to personal property as well (eg, a motor vehicle).

For intangible assets that have no physical location, a legal fiction is created to tie those assets to a specific location. The approach taken by English private international law generally looks at two elements: effective enforcement and specific access to remedies. For example, for assets that require registration, such as securities, shares, and intellectual property, the court where the relevant register is located has jurisdiction. Likewise, a debt is located at the debtor’s usual place of residence. The pattern emerging from the case law is that courts look to adopt a connecting factor for intangibles that is meaningful and will give validity to a future judgment. For a connecting factor to be meaningful, the court must have some degree of actual control over the intangible asset.

The ubiquitous and virtual nature of the Internet challenges these traditional jurisdictional principles. In EU Internet cases, the European Court of Justice has considered relevant factors such as place of residence, place of business, place of causal events, place of damage, and place of performance of the contract.[1] But practice shows that online communication spaces lead to a lack of useful connecting factors. In some cases, artificial connecting factors (eg, the location of the digital wallet) can be partly sufficient if the virtual location cannot be transposed into the real world; in others, using geographical connecting factors (eg, the location of the owner) can be useless because there is no obvious location to tie a cryptocurrency asset to a specific jurisdiction. This becomes even more apparent for cryptoassets related to distributed ledger technology (‘DLT’) (eg, Ethereum).[2] The current international legal framework, including the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce and the United Nations Convention, does not contain specific jurisdictional provisions for the Internet. Its reference points, such as ‘place of business’ and ‘habitual residence’,[3] do not fully take into account the non-territorial nature of the Internet and intangible assets.

Cryptoassets may be a special type of intangible asset. An artificial situs (or site) of the property may have to be established because there may be no direct, natural connecting factor. There is already precedent in English law to permit this. In Ion Science Limited v. Persons Unknown,[4] for example, it was stated that the location of a cryptoasset is ‘the place where the person or company who owns the coin or token is domiciled’. This is a useful starting point; however, it arguably remains an overly territorial approach to the issue of Internet jurisdiction. In this approach, the concept of ownership is tied to aspects of physical ownership and/or exclusive control. If someone claiming to be the rightful owner cannot access a cryptoasset—for example, because they no longer possess the private key, which is a decryption code—how can they prove ownership? If ownership cannot be determined, it may not be possible to determine domicile and jurisdiction. Such top-down judicial solutions may, therefore, not be experimental or iterative enough to keep pace with technological developments. The Law Commission recognised this in its February 2024 ‘Summary on the Call for Evidence’ for the ‘Digital assets and ETDs in private international law: which court, which law?’ law reform project,[5] where it concluded that lex situs is far easier to apply to tangible objects than to digital objects. Applying the lex situs rule to decentralised objects, in particular, is one of the most difficult problems raised by DLT. This is because decentralised cryptotokens are an ‘omniterritorial’ phenomenon: the object does not simply exist ‘nowhere’, but ‘nowhere and everywhere, at the same time’. In this way, cryptotokens exemplify the challenges that digitisation and decentralisation pose to the principle of territoriality, which underpins private international law.

Territoriality, de-territorialisation, and re-territorialisation

New ways of thinking about jurisdiction over the Internet and digital assets are needed. In 2024, territoriality remains the common denominator of both private and public international law. Some scholars have gone as far as to say that our current legal paradigm operates under the tyrannical spectre of territoriality.[6] Extraterritoriality—that is, the application of a given jurisdiction’s laws outside of its own jurisdiction—as a possible response can be expected ultimately to face the same limitations. States asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction typically refer to a territorial reference point, usually one which is based on effects or impact within their own territory.[7] Extraterritoriality is, therefore, not a meaningful solution but a palliative reformulation. But what would a solution look like?

The solution may lie in rethinking the concept of space and its relationship to norm-making or rule-making. Traditionally, connecting factors in private international law tie back to a physical, centralising factor. This factor can be either rather obvious (such as the place where the damage or injury occurred) or artificial (such as the place of the register in which the relevant entitlements are maintained). Therefore, when it comes to digital assets, the temptation might be to rely on the physical infrastructure of the Internet (the place of the cables, servers, and data centres) in order to solve the connecting factor issue. However, identifying these material pillars does not necessarily provide a reliable starting point for responsibility. This is because practical control over the physical infrastructure within the territory does not necessarily result in access to data.[8] For example, the debates over where data is stored[9] (such as on a server in a data centre) and where it can be accessed (such as on a laptop) are governance issues more than they are clear-cut geographical issues. The fact that a server is located within the territory of the United States does not automatically mean that the US government has access to data on that server.[10] If the government does not have access to the data underpinning the digital asset, then enforcement becomes uncertain. Additionally, in the DLT context, nodes supporting the crypto network can be located anywhere in the world—begging the question of whether jurisdiction would then be determined by where the majority of nodes are located, by using geofencing such as identification on the basis of IP address or GPS, or by treating the DLT network as a legal entity and resorting to its place of incorporation as a connecting factor?

The emergence of new asset classes—such as cryptocurrencies, protocol tokens, utility tokens, security tokens, natural asset tokens, crypto collectibles, crypto-fiat currencies, and stablecoins—has exacerbated this unresolved problem. DLT is not territorial; rather, it is peer-to-peer and decentralised. Furthermore, DLT introduces novel concepts such as multisignature and divided control.[11] Multisignature refers to a security mechanism whereby multiple signatures (or private keys) are required to authorize a transaction. For example, if three people have the keys to a multisignature address, and two-thirds of the people are required to agree for a given thing to happen, it is not clear who has custody of the funds.[12] What happens if the key-holders are living in different countries? Assigning a general rule to create a connecting factor may seem sufficient to provide a starting point for case law, but it may not be suitable for enforcement purposes. For example, you may get a connecting factor that allows you to commence proceedings in England, but if one of the key holders lives in Somalia and Somalian law does not recognise the basis on which the English courts agreed to take jurisdiction, the Somalian courts may not permit enforcement of the English judgment—particularly where one or more of those countries may not recognise the jurisdiction of the courts in another of those countries.

Further difficulties are faced given the pseudo-anonymous nature of blockchain. Indeed, without a clear understanding of who the parties are, it becomes difficult to enforce contracts or legal obligations across jurisdictions. Cross-border enforcement mechanisms, such as Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties, often fail to keep up with the rapid pace of DLT transactions. Moreover, decentralised systems, intentionally designed as they are to operate without central intermediaries, lack the means to enforce such decisions.

The best solution for determining jurisdiction over cryptoassets likely lies in developing a unified international legal framework that addresses their unique characteristics as digital assets. Given the global and decentralised nature of cryptoassets, the framework should be based on principles that transcend traditional geographical boundaries and that recognise the digital and often borderless realm in which these assets exist. International cooperation and consensus-building among different jurisdictions are needed to establish common standards and definitions for cryptoassets. This approach could include criteria such as the residence of the asset holder, the location of important nodes in the blockchain network, and/or the principal place(s) of business of the parties involved. Additionally, integrating technological tools such as blockchain analytics into legal proceedings can provide empirical data to support judicial decisions. Such a unified framework would not only ensure clarity and consistency in legal procedures related to cryptoassets but would also create a stable and predictable environment for their use and trading, thereby improving legal compliance for all participants in the digital asset ecosystem. Given the geo-political issues at play, and the varied stances taken by each jurisdiction, such an internationally harmonised approach is unlikely.

Challenges in enforcement against cryptoassets

Jurisdictional issues are inextricably linked to issues that arise in real-world cases. In the UK, judgment creditors have a number of options for enforcing a judgment. These options are each tailored to particular circumstances and are governed by different sections of the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR), the rules that govern the procedural aspects of civil court proceedings in England and Wales.

One method is for the court to appoint a receiver, a person responsible for recovering assets for creditors if the debtor does not pay.[13] Another method involves a third-party debt order, whereby the creditor forces a third party that holds assets for, or is indebted to, the debtor to pay the creditor directly.[14] In addition, charging orders can be obtained against the debtor’s interest in the property, securities, or company assets.[15] A party may also request an ‘attachment of earnings’ order directing the debtor’s employer to periodically withhold amounts from his or her income and forward those amounts to the court for payment to creditors.[16] These diverse mechanisms provide judgment creditors with flexible and effective tools to pursue their claims and ensure that they are satisfied.

In addition to the various enforcement methods available to judgment creditors, the English legal system also provides effective interim relief including in the form of injunctions. Examples include freezing orders, worldwide freezing orders, disclosure orders, and other forms of interim injunction. These injunctions are effective tools to facilitate enforcement. For example, a freezing order can prevent a party from dissipating its assets until a legal dispute is resolved, or judgment enforced, such as by freezing a defendant’s assets other than those the defendant reasonably needs to carry on business. This ensures that assets are not siphoned away to avoid enforcement.

Identification and location of assets

One of the biggest obstacles to enforcing judgments against cryptoassets is the difficulty in identifying and locating such assets. This problem is exacerbated because the decentralised ledger technology underlying cryptocurrencies means that assets are not held in a single location, but rather are distributed across a global network and, in many cases, cannot be traced back to a server, file, or device. Additionally, as stated above, blockchain transactions often allow users to remain anonymous or use pseudonyms, making it difficult to identify the actual person behind the transaction. To complicate matters further still, cryptoassets can be controlled by multiple individuals or entities, resulting in complex ownership structures that obscure the identities of legitimate defendants even more. In fact, much of the existing case law regarding cryptoassets involves court orders against ‘Persons Unknown’, highlighting the limitations of traditional legal tools in identifying responsible parties and holding them accountable.

Cryptocurrency exchanges are at the heart of managing global crypto assets. A large portion of cryptocurrency investors use wallets hosted on these exchanges. As a custodian, the exchange assists investigators and analysts by providing critical information. Asset trackers can request due diligence documents from exchanges and other cryptocurrency institutions, either voluntarily or through court-ordered disclosure. If tracing efforts lead to the identification of a public key address maintained by a third party, such as a cryptocurrency exchange, the injured party can take legal action. This is usually done by applying for a Bankers Trust Order (BTO)[17] or a Norwich Pharmacal Order (NPO) (so named after the claimants in the respective cases in which the orders were first made).[18] The purpose of these orders is to compel third parties to disclose information that can assist the investigation of claims and enforcement of laws.

Cryptocurrency exchanges often hold critical ‘Know Your Customer’ information and other relevant data about their customers. A BTO or NPO can help to determine ownership of wallets containing disputed digital assets. For example, the court in Fetch.ai Ltd and another v Persons Unknown and others [2021] EWHC 2254 (Comm) (15 July 2021) granted a BTO and an NPO against the relevant entities to assist the claimants in tracing the assets. This is particularly helpful where a crypto exchange is found to hold assets on constructive trust for the benefit of the wronged party, making crypto exchanges a route to recovery (see Jones v Persons Unknown [2022] EWHC 2543 (Comm)).

Cross-border enforcement

A number of international agreements and conventions have been concluded in an attempt to address cross-border enforcement. These include, for example, the New York Convention on arbitral awards, the Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Civil and Commercial Judgments on court judgments, and the EU Brussels regime. Yet, despite these attempts to address cross-border enforcement, enforcing a judgment (or arbitral award) in another country can pose significant legal challenges due to differences in national legal systems.

Different national legal systems can have different procedural requirements and standards of fairness, which can engender potential conflict with the domestic law of the country in which enforcement is sought. In Payward Inc et al. v Chechetkin [2023] EWHC 1780 (Comm), a UK court refused to recognise and enforce an arbitral award in favour of a California-based cryptocurrency exchange and trading platform because it was inconsistent with consumer rights protection under UK law and the UK Financial Services and Markets Act 2000—something that would likely not have been a hurdle had enforcement been sought in California.

Whether cryptoassets are treated as property is a matter of international debate, and how they are treated is influenced by each jurisdiction’s legal principles, technical understandings, and public policy considerations. In those jurisdictions where the courts have proceeded on the presumption that cryptoassets are property—such as England and Wales, Singapore, and Hong Kong—enforcement may be relatively straightforward. This is not, however, true for all jurisdictions.

Further, countries such as Tunisia or Nepal, for their parts, have implemented blanket bans on crypto assets.[19] These inconsistencies mean that a claimant who needs to enforce a judgment in a country that refuses to recognise cryptoassets as property, or which makes the transfer, dealing, or owning of such assets illegal, may find itself in choppy waters.

Enforcement using the blockchain—the cure is in the illness

Blockchain technology is a double-edged sword: while it challenges traditional judgment enforcement methods, it also provides solutions that promote innovation and efficiency in legal development. Its complexity highlights the growing need for innovative legal solutions, technological advancements, and global collaboration in order to effectively manage and enforce legal judgments in this digital age.

Asset tracing on the blockchain

Blockchain records are publicly accessible and cannot be deleted. Such transparency allows asset ownership to be tracked from the beginning. Still, some people who want to hide their activities use services like cryptocurrency tumblers or mixers, which mix ‘tainted’ funds with other funds, making the tracing process difficult. This is where the expertise of professional cryptocurrency recovery analysts is crucial. Specialist tracing companies use advanced tools and methods to unravel complex transactions and find their origins.

Unsurprisingly, blockchain analysis tools have become essential tools for lawyers and law enforcement. These sophisticated tools use the immutable nature of the blockchain to analyse transaction patterns, identify wallet addresses, and track asset flows, providing key benefits for tracking and recovering crypto assets. Despite the sophisticated nature of tracing tools, however, blockchain analysis still faces obstacles when dealing with privacy coins like Monero or Zcash, which are specifically designed to enhance privacy and obscure transaction details. Tracing transactions on these networks requires more sophisticated technology and expertise.

As new methods and technologies are developed to improve the privacy and security of crypto transactions, blockchain analytics tools must (and will) evolve accordingly to keep pace. The use of blockchain analytics also raises important questions about privacy, data protection, and regulatory limits in digital finance. Some of the features of blockchain technology, such as encryption and data integrity checks, smoothly align with data protection principles. However, issues such as perpetual data storage, a lack of centralised control, and the inability to restrict cross-border transfers still have to be reconciled.

Enforcing judgments through smart contracts

A smart contract is a self-executing contract that automatically executes once preconditions written in code are met. This technique is particularly effective at executing judgments. For example, smart contracts can ensure that judgment conditions are automatically met. If a court orders a payment settlement, a smart contract can automatically transfer funds from the debtor’s cryptocurrency wallet to the creditor on issuance of the judgment. In cases where assets are frozen, smart contracts can also be used to lock funds or assets, only to be released once certain conditions are met (such as the issuance of a final judgment). This mechanism would permit the automatic release of assets to their rightful owners, streamlining the execution process. Smart contracts are also able to facilitate cross-border enforcement of judgments. Since blockchain operates globally, smart contracts can conduct transactions without being restricted by geographical boundaries, simplifying the process of international enforcement.

While these applications hold great promise, they require strong legal frameworks and technical infrastructure to ensure smart contracts are enforceable and comply with legal standards. Moreover, incorporating smart contracts into the legal system requires foresight and collaboration between lawyers, technology experts, and policymakers to address challenges related to coding, contract interpretation, and dispute resolution. Further, unless obligated by law, they also require the consent of all parties to a cryptoasset transaction. All other things being equal, English law appears to be one of the most attractive governing laws for smart contracts, as it is sufficiently flexible to address both legal and business concerns (see the November 2021 Law Commission advice to the UK Government on the legal status of smart contracts, which highlights that principles of contract law in England allow for the recognition and enforcement of smart contracts, and that courts in England have demonstrated a willingness to adapt and engage with new technologies).

Need for international cooperation in enforcement

It is clear that what is needed is international cooperation, which, when done properly, is very effective. The Silk Road case is a good example. In that case, the notorious online black market Silk Road used Bitcoin to conduct transactions, attracting the attention of law enforcement agencies around the world. The investigation, conducted by the FBI in partnership with multiple international agencies, resulted in the arrest of Ross Ulbricht, the inventor of Silk Road, and the seizure of approximately 170,000 Bitcoins.

To achieve this result, there was extensive international cooperation, with authorities sharing information, resources, and expertise. The agencies involved had to navigate a web of legal systems, each with a unique approach to cryptoassets.[20] This collaboration dismantled a major criminal syndicate, set a precedent for future cases, and highlighted the importance of developing an international legal framework and cooperative mechanisms to effectively track, freeze and enforce judgments against cryptoassets.

Conclusion

The legal environment surrounding cryptoassets must not only address their current state, but also anticipate future developments. A proactive approach to updating existing laws and regulations will be required—one that reflects the nuances and complexities of cryptoassets. This includes clarity on the legal status of different types of digital tokens (such as utility tokens or security tokens) and the recognition of smart contracts in legal proceedings. In addition to updating existing laws, there is a need to develop new legal tools and methods that specifically address the unique challenges posed by the decentralised and digital nature of cryptoassets, such as issues related to cross-border transactions, asset tracking, and judgment enforcement. Helpfully, English common law provides a useful, flexible tool for addressing many of these issues, and English courts have proven to take innovative approaches where necessary to address the nuances of the new cryptoasset world.

Another flexible tool is international arbitration. International, consensual, and private by nature, international arbitration provides a framework conducive to resolving cryptoasset-related disputes. This is particularly as it is supported by the New York Convention, a successful international agreement assisting enforcement across the world. An agreement to arbitrate, however, is just that: a consensual agreement. Unless built into the network so that all users must pre-agree to arbitrate any disputes, many cryptoasset-related claims—particularly those to do with fraud—are unlikely to be subject to a mutually negotiated contract.

Addressing the challenges posed by cryptoassets will require a concerted effort that transcends traditional legal boundaries. An interdisciplinary approach that brings together legal practitioners, technical experts, and policymakers is crucial. This collaboration could provide a more comprehensive understanding of the technical underpinnings of cryptoassets and their implications in the legal realm. Effective enforcement of legal judgments against cryptoassets requires a deep understanding of blockchain technology and its applications. Lawyers armed with these technical insights are better able to develop effective strategies for tracking assets, understanding smart contract disputes, and resolving issues related to digital identity and privacy. The global nature of cryptoassets also highlights the importance of international dialogue and policy development. Forums and conferences that bring together stakeholders from different areas of the law can facilitate the exchange of ideas, best practices, and regulatory experience. This kind of international engagement will go a long way toward ensuring a consistent and unified legal approach to cryptoassets.

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Ioana Bratu, Aleksandra Dziki, and Michael Davar

Ioana Bratu is currently a doctoral researcher with joint supervision from the University of Exeter and the Open University. Her research focus is on jurisdictional issues related to digital platforms and the Internet.

Michael Davar is a Partner at the global law firm Squire Patton Boggs. He specialises in litigation and international arbitration. The Legal 500 2024 highlighted Michael as ‘excellent in his field’, a practitioner who is ‘known for his meticulous attention to detail’, and one who ‘embodies the team’s commitment to excellence’. Michael is named as a ‘Next General Partner’ and is listed as a key lawyer for international arbitration, commercial litigation: mid-market, and commodity disputes.

Aleksandra Dziki is an Associate in the International Dispute Resolution team at Squire Patton Boggs. She specialises in international commercial arbitration, investment treaty arbitration, and shipping disputes. Cryptocurrency-related legal issues are a key focus of her academic writing as cryptocurrency is her retirement plan.

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[1] Tobias Lutzi, ‘Internet Cases in EU Private International Law – Developing a Coherent Approach’ (2017) 66 ICLQ 690.

[2] Examples of non-DLT-related cryptoassets are those backed by a bank or central body, such as China’s Digital Yuan, which operates on a central ledger controlled by the central bank.

[3] Faye Fangfei Wang, Internet Jurisdiction and Choice of Law: Legal Practices in the EU, US and China (CUP 2010) 19.

[4] Ion Science Limited v Persons Unknown (unreported, 21 December 2020).

[5] The Law Commission, ‘Digital assets and ETDs in private international law: which court, which law? Summary of the Call for Evidence’ (February 2024) 16-17 <https://cloud-platform-e218f50a4812967ba1215eaecede923f.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/sites/30/2024/02/Digital-Assets-and-ETDs-in-Private-International-Law-SUMMARY.pdf> accessed 1 July 2024.

[6] Dan Jerker B Svantesson, Solving the Internet Jurisdiction Puzzle (OUP 2017) 13.

[7] Julia Hörnle, Internet Jurisdiction Law and Practice (OUP 2021) 5; Cedric Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International Law (OUP 2015) 6-7. 

[8] Jason Healey, ‘The spectrum of National Responsibility for Cyberattacks’ (2001) 18(1) The Brown Journal of World Affairs 63.

[9] See United States v Microsoft Corp., 584 U.S. (2018).

[10] Amanda Holpuch, ‘Tim Cook says Apple’s refusal to unlock iPhone for FBI is a ‘civil liberties’ issue’ The Guardian (London, 22 February 2016) <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/feb/22/tim-cook-apple-refusal-unlock-iphone-fbi-civil-liberties> accessed 10 September 2024.

[11] Don Tapscott and Alex Tapscott, Blockchain Revolution (Penguin 2018) 291. Multi-signature arrangements are also referred to as M-of-N arrangements, with M being the required number of signatures or keys to authenticate an operation and N being the total number of signatures or keys involved in the arrangement.

[12] Interview with Jerry Brito, 29 June 2015, cited in ibid 32.

[13] Civil Procedure Rules [SI 1998/3132 (L. 17)], Part 69.

[14] ibid, Part 72.

[15] ibid, Part 73.

[16] ibid, Part 89.

[17] Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Customs and Excise Commissioners [1974] A.C. 133.

[18] Bankers Trust Co v. Shapira [1980] 1 WLR 1275.

[19] See ‘Cryptocurrency Regulation Tracker’ (Atlantic Council) <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/programs/geoeconomics-center/cryptoregulationtracker/> accessed 1 January 2024.

[20] See Marie-Helen Maras, ‘Inside Darknet: the takedown of Silk Road’ (2014) 98 Criminal Justice Matters 22-23.