Abstract   The authors, faculty members at Northeastern University and Boston University, highlight the shifting values and priorities of their Millennial and Gen Z students as they prepare for work in the innovation and entrepreneurship fields. In their classes with both undergraduate and graduate students, they explore the rich intersection between creativity, business, and social impact.   In alignment with worldwide trends, their students want to launch ventures that are meaningful, economically viable, and socially responsive to the challenges of our time. As witnesses to increasing economic disparity, the effects of climate change, political upheaval, culture wars, and pandemics like Covid-19, these generations see clearly that business models based only on profit are outdated. The next generation is demanding a shift in the profit-driven paradigm toward one that is inclusive and responsive to a triple bottom line: People, Planet, and Profit.   Gen Z and Millennial students want to solve problems that truly matter while honouring their individuality; they want to make a positive impact in their communities in a way that is also financially sustainable.   The authors share case studies that emphasize the importance of integrating their four part Make/Care/Strategize/Implement (MCSI) Framework into the fabric of organizations from the visioning stage to implementation:   MAKE like artists CARE like activists STRATEGIZE like entrepreneurs IMPLEMENT like organizers   By implementing the MCSI Framework, the next generation of entrepreneurs will have the building blocks necessary to embrace a more holistic, sustainable approach to business that lays a foundation for a lifetime of meaningful, impactful work.   Bringing Meaning to the Marketplace   Let us paint a picture for you. Or better yet, we will share our story in three acts:   Act 1: Individuals   We see a need for the next generation of students to gain entrepreneurial skills to develop meaningful ventures for the future. Starting with artists and arts administrators, and branching out across university silos to incorporate students from across disciplines, we create graduate and undergraduate courses and introduce the Make/Care/Strategize/Implement (MCSI) Framework.   Act 2: Community   We host a symposium, Art and Ideas in Action: Arts + Business + Social Impact,  utilizing the MCSI Framework, and confirm that imaginative thinking, strategic partnerships with key stakeholders, and clear measurable outcomes are essential to inspire meaning and hope during complex times, not just for students but for broader community-based audiences. This symposium is a catalyst for what is now the largest conference for students interested in innovation and entrepreneurship, IDEA  Con , hosted annually by Innovate@BU, Boston University. [1]   Act 3: Society   With the rapid advancement of artificial intelligence and a host of other challenges, we recognize the importance of the integrated MCSI Framework to develop a human-centered economy. Through intentional, strategic integration of creativity, higher education can take the lead in providing a clearer sense of purpose and promoting innovative solutions amongst its students.   Act 1: Individuals   The Beginning: Teaching Professional Skills to Artists   Art students (visual, performance, and music) spend thousands of hours perfecting their craft with little space to gather the tools they need to market their work. Many art students graduate with highly developed artistic expertise in their chosen disciplines but lack the entrepreneurial skills necessary to create the impact they want, and arguably the impact society needs.   When we were asked to co-create an experimental course called Cultural Entrepreneurship  within the graduate Arts Administration program at Boston University, we welcomed the challenge to teach artists and arts administrators how to reimagine new revenue streams that support their creative expertise and competencies. With backgrounds in   arts, social impact, political organizing, and entrepreneurial consulting, we as instructors emphasized a practical and experiential learning-based approach.   As faculty members, we are committed to unlocking students’ creative and entrepreneurial mindsets, and our courses help students to recognize their potential to be change makers. We challenge our students to create vibrant, economically viable ventures that extend from their visionary entry points as artists and arts leaders. Introducing our students to the vocabulary of startups, from Minimum Viable Product (MVP) to Return On Investment (ROI), we teach the distinctions between various business models, including nonprofit, for-profit, and benefit corporations. While this is basic information for business students, it is rarely talked about in art schools.   Cultural Entrepreneurship as an academic discipline has had a 20+ year history in the UK, drawing international attention with the publication of John Howkins’s book, The Creative Economy: How People Make Money from Ideas . [2] Nonetheless, in the context of Boston University’s arts administration program, the introduction of this class in 2013 was groundbreaking. Since the course began, we have taught thousands of students, many of whom continue to remain in contact with us. As of 2023, over 40% of those surveyed have launched their own ventures, as both entrepreneurs and intrapreneurs, at the intersection of Arts & Culture, Business & Technology, and Social Impact.   We treat our course as an incubator for real-world startup ideas, taking students through ideation, testing, and pitching their new ventures. Our students are excited and energized by this learning-by-doing approach. For many, this is the first time they are learning about the workings of the rapidly evolving creative economy, along with the challenges and opportunities for art entrepreneurs.   Our students are growing and thriving, using words such as ‘transformative’, ‘exhilarating’, and ‘eye opening’ to describe their experiences in our class. We have tapped into a desire for a new definition for success: one that includes financial viability, but also creative engagement and social relevance. This makes honing a creative, entrepreneurial mindset an important professional skill. Our primary focus when we first started in 2013 was to teach artists and arts administrators the importance of keeping an eye on the broader markets and communities while also fulfilling their individual creative purpose. We created a safe community-oriented classroom that encouraged students to get comfortable taking risks while developing their entrepreneurial skills and perfecting their artistic crafts so that they could generate their own economic opportunities.   While we started by teaching artists the skills and language of the innovation and entrepreneurship world, our interdisciplinary approach has now expanded to students from various disciplines. We use a framework that teaches a creative mindset to serve a broader population.   It was in these first classrooms that our MCSI Framework originated:   MAKE LIKE ARTISTS:  While creativity is inherent in every individual, we help students access it and integrate creativity into their day-to-day lives. Using the Creative Re/Frame M.A.K.E. Framework we help students get Messy to activate idea generation, be Awake and Aware of opportunities around them, Keep going through their challenges and Enjoy the process.   We offer our students the tools and techniques to foster a creative mindset, unlocking imagination to envision new strategic and innovative solutions.   CARE LIKE ACTIVISTS:  Caring for the larger community makes for better business and for deeper personal fulfilment. Using a Creative Re/frame C.A.R.E Framework, we help students hone in on the powers of Curiosity, Awareness, Responsibility, and Empathy and connect these elements to unique organizational value propositions.   STRATEGIZE LIKE ENTREPRENEURS:  Using design thinking, we empower our students to develop their ventures step-by-step. By right-sizing and strategically structuring business models, students can successfully set specific, measurable, and achievable goals.   IMPLEMENT LIKE ORGANIZERS:  We help students translate ideas into action. Urgency, tasks, timelines, and measuring impact are crucial for success. We stay highly focused on final products aimed at the systemic change needed to create long-lasting impact.   CASE STUDY: BENDADA MUSIC FESTIVAL [3]   Inês Andrade, a doctoral candidate in performance classical piano at Boston University’s College of Fine Arts, traveled from Lisbon to her family’s home of Bendada, Portugal. While she had driven the mountainous windy roads countless times in her life, this year was different. She had been asked to perform a Christmas concert in the newly inaugurated Casa da Música da Bendada , a well-appointed music school built with funding from a European Union grant. The building was beautiful; its soundproof practice rooms and a modern concert hall overlooked the valley below. But aside from the Christmas concert, the hall was largely empty the rest of the year. The town of Bendada has had a long history with music, starting in 1870 when the Sociedade Filarmónica Bendadense  was established. This musical history, combined with the economic demise of the region from the 1970s, got Inês thinking. She was performing in a gorgeous music hall, and she realized this was an opportunity to create something more. The seed for the Bendada Music Festival was planted. ‘I always knew I wanted to do more with music than just perform concerts’, she says. ‘I wanted to create something that could make an artistic and economic impact that could help revitalize the whole community. My community’.   As a committed artist dedicated to piano from an early age, Inês had the artist’s discipline to finely hone her expertise, connecting to a purpose that she then shared with others. Inês came to the first part of the MCSI Framework (Make Like an Artist) from an authentic entry point. As an artist, she channelled her creative practice to an intention that fuelled and inspired both herself and others.   Back in Boston for her final semester prior to receiving her doctorate, Inês enrolled in the Cultural Entrepreneurship class. Inês used the course to workshop her vision and build skills using the MCSI Framework to:   Make Like an Artist by building on her credibility as a well-established musician. Care Like an Activist by owning her authentic connection to the town of Bendada, its long history as a music centre, and undertaking research to more fully understand its current plight. Strategize Like an Entrepreneur by networking to build a sustainable funding model. Implement Like an Organizer by partnering with the Portuguese Secretary of Economic Development, Portugal State Tourism office, and the Boston University community.   Integrating the four pieces of MCSI, Inês was able to turn her idea into a viable international program that has had a quantifiable impact in the region and beyond . But she knew she couldn't do this alone, nor did she want to. She formed a formidable partnership with a fellow doctoral candidate in performance piano, Edoardo Carpenedo. Edoardo took the same graduate class the following year so they could have a common language and vision as they prototyped their venture they founded together, the Bendada Music Festival.     In the summer of 2024, the Bendada Music Festival completed its 9 th  year with a record number of students, ranging in age from 14 to 22 years old. Music teachers from around the world, and corporate, community, and governmental partners, all gathered to enjoy captivating concerts. Thousands of audience members from local communities came together in unique concert venues ranging from 12 th -century castles to 16 th -century churches. The local community participates in the Bendada Community choir, hosts a folk festival in the town square alongside the music festival, and houses students in individual homes. Along with the hundreds of students and instructors who hone their skills through the festival each year, Bendada citizens participate as musicians and concert goers, and restaurants and hostels benefit from the increase in tourism and revenue. Act 2: Community   The Ripples: Recognizing the Need for MCSI in a Larger Context   As impact-oriented educators as well as community-based professionals we wanted to share our learnings in the classroom with a larger audience. We set out to create an opportunity for our students to network with innovators within the corporate, nonprofit and political arenas, as well as to share our resources and learnings with the broader Boston community so that it was not sequestered to the campus. We understood the importance of igniting the power of interdisciplinary partnerships to scale the impact of what we were creating in the classroom. Building on the MCSI Framework, we partnered with the BU’s College of Fine Arts, Questrom School of Business, and the BU Arts Initiative to introduce a unique, creative public symposium: Arts & Ideas in Action: Arts + Business + Social Impact .   Tapping into our own collective creative mindset to make  our vision a reality, we cared like activists, reaching out to cross-disciplinary stakeholders to work with us to infuse energy, hope and purpose into a welcoming space. We strategically  built cross-disciplinary alliances across the campus as well as the city to create an impactful agenda. And we  implemented  a rich, community-based, inclusive conference filled with energy, hope, and measurable outcomes at Boston University on 11 November 2016.   The theme of the conference was optimism and hope. We planned to model how the arts and business communities could work together toward a common good, despite being unlikely bedfellows. We incorporated our students into conference planning through an Ambassador program and invited our communities from outside of the university. The planning committee agreed that it would be best to hold the event after the US Presidential election. The 11 November 2016 date seemed ideal—the event would happen toward the end of the semester but not too close to the holidays. Three days before the symposium,   surprising election results revealed a very divided country. And as any good organizer, innovator, entrepreneur, or improv actor knows, our job was to remain nimble while working with dynamic variables.   After the US Presidential election, the direction of our symposium shifted from confidence to confusion, from optimism to uncertainty. We were bringing together Boston’s business and arts community after a highly divisive election. We asked ourselves, ‘How can we acknowledge the tense post-election climate without being political? How can we maintain a tone of collaboration and promote goodwill among people who potentially held opposing beliefs?’. Originally, we thought that the symposium would offer innovative networking opportunities; now we feared that the audience would be unable to span their differences.   Our sold-out crowd filled the newly renovated Boston University Graphic Design department’s space. Attendees from Boston-based for-profits, nonprofits, and government agencies gathered with higher education administrators, faculty, and students to explore the question, ‘What happens when art and business join forces to create stable economic opportunities and build vibrant communities while addressing societal needs?’.   To acknowledge the political sea change, we updated our introductory slide deck to include a Toni Morrison quote: ‘This is precisely the time when artists go to work. There is no time for despair, no time for self-pity, no need for silence, no room for fear. We speak, we write, we do language. That is how civilizations heal’. We knew that no matter how people voted or what political views they held, we stood by the belief that the arts have the power to connect, fortify and help us to build equitable, healthy, empathetic, respectful communities that benefit everyone.   To our delight, the tone of the symposium honoured our original vision to create an atmosphere of hope and possibility, but with even more energy and focus. Not only did artists need economic opportunities, but it was abundantly clear that businesses needed creative partners to help reimagine new ways forward. We began to think about the potential for arts and business collaborations to develop in a larger socio-economic context.   When Boston University’s BUild Lab IDG Capital Student Innovation Centre opened their doors in 2017, we partnered with them as creative practitioners in residence to expand upon the model of the Arts & Ideas in Action: Arts + Business + Social Impact   symposium to design and grow what is now the largest cross disciplinary student innovation conference in the USA, IDEA Con. [4]  Fast forward to October 2024 and IDEA Con, now with over 700 participants registered from 25 colleges and universities, incorporated an exercise from the MCSI second module of CARE Like an Activist through interactive CARE Cafés with all the participants in the auditorium.   These CARE Cafés were introduced by first posing the questions: ‘Where does creative innovation come from? And ‘What are problems worth solving?’. The CARE Cafés provided an opportunity for attendees to verbalize to each other what motivates them to get involved in something beyond themselves by exploring their CARE: an acronym for Curiosity, Awareness, Empathy, and Responsibility.   Prompts included:   WHAT  big problems are you curious about? HOW  do you want to address these problems? WHERE  do you think this interest/desire comes from? WHY are you the one to address this? Why now? WHAT  is your unique entry point into this problem? WHO else do you want to talk with to explore this problem/opportunity?   Once attendees had an opportunity to gather their individual ideas through a journaling exercise, they were put in two long lines and participated in a time-based speed dating-like activity. By giving individuals an opportunity to explore what they care about and articulate it to others, we allowed them to make authentic connections with a larger community, hatch partnerships, and deepen their sense of meaning from the event.   In addition to the CARE Cafés, IDEA Con highlights young creative entrepreneurs by giving them opportunities to share their stories in five-minute, TED Talk-style presentations. These speakers follow the MCSI Framework, inspiring attendees to tap into their own wellspring of curiosity. Over the years IDEA Con has featured student innovators such as:   Max Bard . [5]  A graduate of Boston University’s MFA program, Max is an interdisciplinary artist who uses recycled materials for his pieces with clients ranging from Google to national parks and galleries. IDEA Con hired Max to create a sculptural piece during the day-long conference emphasizing the theme of sustainability. His pop-up artist studio on the first floor of the Questrom School of Business at IDEA Con was an interactive practice inviting attendees to comment, share and discuss his piece in real time emphasizing the importance of Making like an Artist.   Ellice Patterson . [6] While studying for her MS from Boston University, Ellice was also establishing her non-profit organization Abilities Dance Boston that uses dance as a tool to advocate for intersectional disability rights. Ellice was a speaker for IDEA Con and modelled the importance of Caring like an Activist by creating a venture that aligns with her belief that dance should be inclusive of all body types. Her dance troupe then joined her on the stage to share their work and a performance with the audience.   Anj Fayemi . [7]  A rap artist and computer scientist from Nigeria, Anj was studying at MIT when he stumbled across a problem he was uniquely suited to solve. He was getting ready to release a new album and wondered, ‘How can artists use technology to directly interact and grow their fan base?’. He founded his for profit company, Rivet, in his third year at MIT and shared his story at IDEA Con from ideation to implementation underling the critical aspects of Strategizing Like and Entrepreneur and Implementing Like an Activist.   While continually refining the MCSI Framework, we have had opportunities to introduce the approach to thousands of students, professionals, and international dignitaries. We have found that no matter the age, experience, or industry there is a deep connection to incorporating the four quadrants of the MCSI Framework to make more meaningful work. The MCSI Framework clarifies and encourages participants to pay attention to the distinct puzzle pieces starting with authenticity and ending with solving problems that matter.   Act 3: Society   Reframing Future Economies   We have arrived at Act 3 in our story. In Act 1, our goal was to introduce entrepreneurial skills to art students, which we then grew into an interdisciplinary approach to creative entrepreneurship integrating our MCSI framework. In Act 2, our perspective broadened to reveal how the MCSI framework can serve a larger community through the symposium Arts & Ideas in Action: Arts + Business + Social Impact and later, through the IDEA Con Student Innovation Conference.   Our Gen Z and Millennial students are acutely aware of the uncertain economic future with the rapid advancement of artificial intelligence and a host of challenges including climate change, economic disparity and political unrest. They seek employment that reflects their triple bottom line values, provides financial security and offers hope for the future. If they can’t find these opportunities in existing companies, they are committed to building new ones. And our students are not alone—in the Deloitte 2023 Gen Z and Millennial Survey: Waves of Change: Acknowledging progress, confronting setbacks, 22,000 Millennials and Gen Z’ers across 36 countries responded with a deep concern for unethical business practices and political unrest. [8]  With businesses holding the locus of power in our time, Millennials and Gen Z’ers look to business leaders to rise up to address economic greed, disparity and the impending impacts of climate challenges.   Researchers from UK-based research organizations, Nesta and Pearson, assert that the future will require both human and machine capacities. As automation and artificial intelligence expand in the workplace, so will the need for deeply human skills like ‘originality, active learning and the fluency of ideas’. [9] The MCSI Framework offers student innovators the opportunity to cultivate and integrate deeply human skills into their ventures. As educators, we believe higher education is poised to lead a paradigm shift, providing students with the language and tools to become our future creative, caring, and strategic innovators.   We have arrived at the end of Act 3, but the curtain does not close. Universities are poised to play a key role as incubators for interdisciplinary collaboration and socially responsible innovation. Through a holistic approach that integrates making, caring, strategizing, and implementing, together we can create the meaningful businesses of the future. Wendy Swart Grossman and Jeannette Guillemin Wendy Swart Grossman is both a faculty member at the Questrom School of Business at Boston University as well as a co-founder of Creative Re/Frame, LLC.  With a background in global presidential politics and NGO and non-profit social impact organizations, she infuses creativity into her classrooms and client spaces to drive authentic community centered change to amplify the voices of her students and clients missions.    Jeannette (Jen) Guillemin is both a faculty member at the D’Amore-McKim School of Business at Northeastern University as well as a co-founder of Creative Re/Frame, LLC. With a background spanning arts leadership, counseling, and experiential learning, she integrates creativity and reflection into her classrooms and client collaborations to cultivate ethical leadership, foster resilience, and spark community-centered innovation. [1]  See ‘IDEA Con 2024’ ( Boston University ) < https://www.bu.edu/innovate/events/idea-con/ > accessed 19 December 2024. [2]  John Howkins, The Creative Economy: How People Make Money from Ideas  (Allen Lane 2001). [3]  See ‘Bendada Music Festival’ < https://bendadamusicfestival.com/ > accessed 19 December 2024. [4]  See (n 1). [5]  See ‘Home’ ( Max Bard ) < https://maxbard911.com/ > accessed 19 December 2024. [6]  See ‘Abilities Dance Boston’ < https://www.abilitiesdanceboston.org/ > accessed 19 December 2024. [7]  See ‘Where we began’ ( Rivet ) < https://www.rivet.app/about-us > accessed 19 December 2024. [8]  ‘2023 Gen Z and Millennial Survey’ ( Deloitte ) < https://www2.deloitte.com/cn/en/pages/about-deloitte/articles/genzmillennialsurvey-2023.html > accessed 19 December 2024. [9]  Hasan Bakhshi, Jonathan M Downing, Michael A Osborne, and Philippe Schneider, ‘The Future of Skills Employment in 2030’ ( Pearson and Nesta , 2017) < https://media.nesta.org.uk/documents/the_future_of_skills_employment_in_2030_0.pdf > accessed 19 December 2024.

The voice came from an oblong metal plaque like a dulled mirror which formed part of the surface of the right-hand wall […]. The instrument (the telescreen, it was called) could be dimmed, but there was no way of shutting it off completely.[1]   1. Introduction Prior to the spring of 2020, two notable events occurred in quick succession: surveillance vans equipped with Live Facial Recognition (‘LFR’) technologies were seen patrolling Cardiff City Stadium before the club’s football match with Swansea City,[2] and the Metropolitan Police Service announced that it had installed an LFR camera at Oxford Circus, a highly-trafficked area in the Westminster borough of London.[3] Facial recognition is by no means the only way in which personal data is captured and used by the police,[4] but it is certainly one that has gripped the imagination of the public. Civil society groups have described the technology as an ‘Orwellian mass surveillance tool’ not unlike the instruments used in the fictional state of Oceania in 1984 .[5] The increasing use of facial recognition technology by law enforcement agencies, therefore, poses an acute regulatory challenge, with many concerned that ‘existing legislative and policy frameworks are outdated and fail to account for the new and various ways in which biometric data is, or might be, accessed and used’.[6]   This article seeks to contribute to evolving scholarship on the use of LFR by law enforcement from the vantage point of international human rights law (‘IHRL’).[7] It begins by situating the regulation of LFR within the parameters of the relationship between the law and technology, before elaborating on how LFR operates, as well as on the justifications for its deployment by police forces. The article then examines the main sources of international law on discrimination that apply in this context, focusing in particular on the issue of racial bias. It does not, however, set out an exhaustive checklist of the potential systemic biases inherent in LFR technology; rather, it addresses the underlying normative question of when, if ever, the police may make use of such tools in a manner compliant with IHRL principles on equality and non-discrimination.   2. LFR and the relationship between law and technology   The nature of the relationship between the law and technology has been debated at length. Proponents of technological exceptionalism have suggested that the ‘essential qualities’ of technology ‘drive the legal and policy conversations that attend them’.[8] This school of thought reinforces what Carter and Marchant have described as the ‘pacing problem’: the idea that ‘rules-based regulation cannot keep up with the pace of new developments’.[9] Indeed, the notion that the law is ill-equipped to deal with the extent and rate of technological advancement has received traction amongst scholars. Johnson and Post, for example, in response to the limitations of ‘territorially-based law-making and law-enforcing authorities’,[10] have argued in favour of a new form of Internet governance, unbound by geographical boundaries. Similarly, Calo has suggested that the interaction of new and emerging technologies with outmoded legal frameworks prompts a ‘systematic change to the law or legal institutions in order to reproduce, or if necessary, displace, an existing balance of values’.[11] This process is not framed as static in nature, but as one continually on the move, since ‘technology has not stood still’.[12]   However, there are those that have expressed reservations about attempts to linearise the relationship between the development of the law and technological change. Jones, in particular, has criticised theories of technological exceptionalism for failing to account for the fact that ‘the story of law and technological change is much more varied, messy, and political’.[13] According to Jones, rather than linearly following technology, ‘a great deal of legal work shapes technology and the way in which it will be understood in the future’, with ‘scholars, judges, regulators, and legislators often [making sense] of technologies in a way that is forward-looking’.[14] In a similar vein, Balkin indicates that it is ‘[unhelpful] to speak in terms of ‘essential qualities’ of a new technology that we can then apply to law’.[15] Although acknowledging that Calo’s thesis ‘is destined to be the starting point for much future research in the area’, Balkin argues in favour of assessing the evolving uses of emerging technology for the purposes of developing the law, given that ‘people continually find new ways to employ technology for good or for ill’.[16]   The global governance of LFR and so too its uses in law enforcement contexts are thoroughly interconnected with competing conceptions of the relationship between law and technology. On one hand, the essentialist tendencies of technological exceptionalism have been borne out in descriptions that stress the novelty of facial recognition as ‘an attractive solution to address many contemporary needs for identification’, bringing together ‘the promise of other biometric systems […] and the more familiar functionality of visual surveillance systems’.[17] On the other hand, a number of authors have raised concerns about the uses (and abuses) of such technology on human rights grounds.[18] For instance, scholars including Bu have attempted to evaluate the lawfulness of facial recognition technology by reference to both EU data protection rules and the privacy jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’).[19] Whilst attention has naturally focused on the extent to which infringements upon privacy and data protection rights may be ‘justified as a necessary and proportional invasion’,[20] the extent to which the use of LFR has been tested against international legal principles and standards on discrimination remains under-developed.[21] Indeed, in the British context, Bradford, Yesberg, Jackson, and Dawson have described ‘potential bias and discrimination’ as a ‘significant controversy’ in the use of LFR by police forces—a concerning possibility which requires consideration of two issues.[22] First, what justifications have been raised in favour of the use of LFR by police forces? Second, what specific aspects of LFR usage by law enforcement raise the spectre of potential discrimination?   3. The operation of LFR   In perhaps the most sustained independent analysis of the use of LFR in the context of British policing, Fussey and Murray identify four salient features.[23] First, facial recognition technology allows ‘for the real time biometric processing of video imagery’; unlike CCTV cameras, the process by which individuals are identified and tracked through their facial features is partly automated.[24] Second, compared to open street surveillance cameras, LFR possesses ‘additional and powerful capabilities’ in the form of ‘enhanced data-matching’.[25] Third, LFR is integrative in nature: it is possible for such technology to be accommodated into ‘police body worn cameras or city-wide surveillance camera networks, on a 24/7 basis, and for the resultant data to be subject to automated analysis’.[26] Fourth, the objects identified in the deployment of facial recognition technology are not disposable or transferable: the software ‘creates a digital signature of identified faces, and then analyses those digital signatures against a database (referred to as the ‘watchlist’) in order to determine whether there are any matches’.[27]   4. The rationales for police use of LFR   Having briefly outlined how facial recognition technology operates, there is one remaining question that warrants consideration: why, exactly, has LFR been promoted in modern policing practices? The answer to this question rests on the belief that the technology advances the aims of effective policing and crime prevention. It is my proposal that this assumption is predicated on two rationales—efficiency and impartiality—and that the orthodoxies upon which these rationales in turn rest have unstable foundations. The gaps and inconsistencies responsible for this instability are significant to the extent that they impinge upon the discrimination risks associated with the use of facial recognition tools by law enforcement agencies.   a. Efficiency   In attempting to justify its deployment by police forces, advocates of LFR have repeatedly lauded its ‘efficiency’ in enhancing surveillance capabilities. As Hamman and Smith have put it, ‘[facial recognition] technology has benefited law enforcement in innumerable ways, such as creating reliable evidence, enabling efficient investigations, and helping to accumulate data that allow law enforcement to react quickly and effectively’.[28] This emphasis on the functionality of facial recognition technology can be directly correlated with the increasing use of such tools ‘to ensure security and combat terrorism around the world’.[29] Yet LFR also has the potential to be employed in situations that fall outside the scope of national security and counterterrorism operations. As observed by the Divisional Court in R (Bridges) v Chief Constable of South Wales and Ors [2019] EWHC 2341:     Like fingerprints and DNA, AFR technology enables the extraction of unique information and identifiers about an individual allowing his or her identification with precision in a wide range of circumstances. Taken alone or together with other recorded metadata, AFR-derived biometric data is an important source of personal information.[30]   There is cause for concern with regard to the potential mission creep of facial recognition technology into operational policing writ large. Whilst efficiency-based arguments in favour of using LFR in law enforcement contexts hinge upon its putative benefits, what is less clear is whether they are grounded in empirical evidence. At present, the Face Recognition Vendor Test, a series of large-scale assessments of LFR systems realised by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (‘NIST’) in the United States, represents the most comprehensive independent evaluation of cross-demographical performance inconsistencies in such technology.[31] Its 2019 study of 189 LFR software programs identified that racial minorities were up to 100 times more likely to be wrongfully identified than White males in facial recognition deployment exercises.[32] Other analyses have also identified problems with LFR software in relation to the accurate identification of juveniles and darker-skinned women.[33] These inconsistencies raise serious concerns as to the effectiveness of LFR as a mode of data-driven policing and undermine the extent to which the attendant disruption to ‘the balance of power between governors and the governed’ is normatively warranted.[34]   b. Impartiality   Morgenthau’s conception of the police as ‘law-enforcing agency’ usefully illustrates how the notion of police impartiality is, at its very core, a protean concept.[35] On one hand, the meaning of police impartiality may be viewed as identical to that of equality before the law: ‘the police are in this sense impartial if they mete out equal treatment to persons and situations which the law requires to be so’.[36] Nevertheless, the impartiality of the police also ‘performs a social and political function similar to that performed by the reputation of the courts for being the impartial “mouthpiece” of the law’.[37] As it is the purpose of law enforcement agencies in this context to ‘defend that legal order and maintain that status quo’, an institution whose purpose is ‘the defense of the legal order cannot be impartial with regard to it, but must rather be for or against it’.[38]   With respect to the use of LFR by law enforcement agencies, impartiality is closely allied with the notion of accuracy. The NIST’s Face Recognition Vendor Test clearly illustrates this association.[39] NIST assesses the correctness of classification procedures so that ‘face recognition system developers, and end users should be aware of these differences and use them to make decisions and to improve future performance’.[40] In correlating the ostensible precision of algorithms with notions of fairness and objectivity, the use of facial recognition technology by law enforcement agencies promises to improve the accuracy of suspect identification[41] and curb discriminatory uses of police discretion, such as in the stop and search context.[42]    There is, however, one problematic point that can be drawn from the use of impartiality as a rationale for the deployment of LFR by police forces. As mentioned earlier, the social and political function of police impartiality—that is, to defend the legal order and maintain the status quo—inevitably raises the question of whether LFR may in fact entrench existing biases amongst law enforcement agencies. The long and difficult history of communities of colour feeling the sharp edge of the law as a consequence of police action heightens the significance of such an inquiry.[43] Given that the disproportionate representation of Black people in the criminal justice system has, in the words of one author, become ‘the single most vexed, hotly controversial and seemingly intractable issue in the politics of crime, policing and social control’, the reinforcement of this status quo via LFR technology engages fundamental issues as to the categorisation of relations between the police and minority ethnic communities.[44]   5. International human rights law on discrimination   The principle of non-discrimination has served as a constant since the nascence of human rights law in the form of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which applies without ‘distinction of any kind’.[45] The Intentional Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (‘CERD’) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’)—the two most important treaties on the prohibition of discrimination in the context of civil liberties—provide fertile ground for an analysis of whether the use of LFR by law enforcement agencies is IHRL-compliant.   International law prohibits both direct and indirect discrimination and places positive and negative obligations on States to uphold these prohibitions. The CERD prohibits discrimination on the basis of ‘race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin’,[46] and obliges States, in particular, to legislate against racial discrimination and ensure compliance amongst public authorities with the obligations set out in legislation.[47] Discrimination on the same grounds is prohibited under the ICCPR. Indeed, the ICCPR further clarifies that the right to not be discriminated against ‘on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin’ is non-derogable,[48] even in situations such as public emergencies where States may permissibly limit other rights (freedom of expression, for example).[49] Framed within the parameters of this overarching framework, the question that falls to be determined is whether international law prohibits the use of race, or a proxy for race, as a factor in the deployment of LFR technology by law enforcement.   For the sake of this inquiry, it is necessary to outline the elements of direct and indirect discrimination under international law. Direct discrimination occurs when an act has the ‘purpose’ of ‘nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise’ of a particular group’s rights or freedoms.[50] Of most direct relevance to the use of LFR by law enforcement, indirect discrimination involves actions or policies that are ostensibly neutral but which in practice have a disproportionate impact, or ‘effect’, on a particular group’s enjoyment of rights or freedoms.[51] The particular context and circumstances of an act are relevant considerations for these purposes; as confirmed by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in L.R. v Slovakia, ‘indirect discrimination can only be demonstrated circumstantially’.[52] Notwithstanding the recognition of ‘purpose-based’ and ‘effect-based’ discrimination under IHRL, not all forms of disparate or disproportionate treatment are impermissible. A difference in treatment will not constitute discrimination if the criteria for such differentiation are ‘legitimate’.[53]   The practice of ‘racial profiling’ in policing—namely, ‘the use of race, ethnicity, religion, or national origin rather than individual behaviour as the basis for making law enforcement decisions about who may be involved in criminal activity’—exposes the slippage between ostensibly legitimate forms of discrimination and conduct which violates international law.[54] Bowling and Phillips, for instance, have argued that crime statistics could be seen as both a ‘shield’ for law enforcement agencies in the United Kingdom ‘with which to defend the disproportionate use of stop search’, and a ‘sword’ by which ‘police officers might select suspects’ within groups purported to be likely participants in criminal activity.[55] In the American context, Morris has demonstrated how violations of international law are revealed in evidence concerning the disparate impact of pretextual traffic stops on African Americans.[56] These instances of disproportionality do not just incur profound costs at an individual level, but also directly impinge upon the relationship of minority ethnic communities with the criminal justice system: ‘the systematic profiling of black and minority ethnic groups inevitably leads these groups to lose faith in the very authorities that are meant to protect them’.[57] As a consequence, racial profiling conducted under the auspices of crime prevention objectives undermines the very enjoyment of rights guaranteed under the CERD and ICCPR. The significance of LFR in this paradigm relates to its use as a medium by which discriminatory police practices are not only reflected but entrenched.   A textual analysis of the CERD and its interpretative instruments illustrates its potential utility as a means of regulating the deployment of LFR by the police. The object and purpose of the Treaty, according to its Preamble, is to ‘combat racist doctrines and practices’.[58] Article 2 of the CERD obliges States to ‘engage in no act or practice of racial discrimination’, [59] as well as to ‘amend, rescind or nullify’ any local, national or governmental policies which are identified as having the effect of perpetuating discrimination.[60] Regarding the administration of justice, General Recommendation No. 31 provides that States must take necessary steps to prevent ‘questioning, arrests and searches’ based solely on ‘that person’s colour or features or membership of a racial or ethnic group’, or any profiling which exposes him or her to greater suspicion.[61] Correspondingly, General Recommendation No. 13 provides that law enforcement officials must be ‘properly informed about the obligations their state has entered into under the Convention’ and conduct ‘intensive training to ensure that in the performance of their duties they respect as well as protect human dignity and maintain and uphold the human rights of all persons without distinction’.[62] These provisions are significant to the extent that they provide a framework against which the discriminatory impacts of facial recognition technology can be tested, recognising the role of the police as an entry point into the criminal justice system and a means by which States can exercise coercive measures.   6. LFR and racial bias   The issue of racial bias is a point of contention amongst critics and proponents of LFR.[63] Whilst comprehensive studies such as NIST’s Face Recognition Vendor Test have identified extensive demographic biases in deployment exercises, localised assessments conducted in recent years suggest that these discrepancies have been overstated. Indeed, in April 2023, the National Physical Laboratory (‘NPL’), the national measurement standards laboratory of the United Kingdom, tested two facial recognition systems currently used by the Metropolitan Police Service and South Wales Police.[64] Although the NPL study confirmed that the LFR software had the poorest performance on Black-Female faces, it noted that the demographic inconsistencies in accuracy rates were statistically insignificant.[65] The suggestion that statistical insignificance is decisive in overcoming the issue of demographic bias, however, dislocates the use of such technology from its immediate context. The implications of inaccuracies in LFR, however miniscule they are purported to be, can be severe when paired with historical racial disparities in police contact. A false positive match places an individual at risk of being subjected to escalated action in the form of police stops, detentions, and arrests because of an incorrect match against a database.   The divergence in empirical evidence on demographic bias goes to the heart of an assessment of the legality of LFR. In Bridges , the Court of Appeal determined that, in failing to take reasonable steps to make enquiries about whether facial recognition software had bias on racial or sex grounds, the South Wales Police had failed to comply with the Public Sector Equality Duty (‘PSED’) under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010.[66] Despite the lack of clear evidence of racial bias, as Gikay observes, the Court’s findings in respect of the PSED ‘demonstrates that the current equality law [in the UK] can effectively address the concerns of inaccuracy and bias that are raised by the use of LFR technology by law enforcement authorities’.[67] In light of the widespread cross-jurisdictional use of LFR technology, the question remains as to whether IHRL principles on discrimination can be used to these same ends.[68]   7. LFR and indirect racial discrimination   Whilst law enforcement agencies generally do not make use of LFR technology for the purposes of direct discrimination, the effects of potential biases and errors, as discussed, mean that these tools can have a disproportionate impact on racial minority groups compared to other ethnic groups. This amounts to a form of indirect discrimination under the CERD, so long as the ‘criteria for such differentiation, judged against the objectives and purposes of the Convention [are not] legitimate’.[69]   The jurisprudence of the ECtHR is particularly instructive with regard to the issue of legitimate differentiation under international law.[70] The ECtHR has defined discrimination as differential treatment, ‘without an objective and reasonable justification, [of] persons in relevantly similar situations’.[71] A difference in treatment is discriminatory under Article 14 of the ECHR if it has no objective and reasonable justification—that is, if it does not pursue a ‘legitimate aim’ or if there is not a ‘reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised’.[72] Examining a discrimination claim in this context thus requires a two-tiered approach, focusing first on the aim pursued, and second on the relationship between the impugned difference in treatment and the realisation of that aim.   Although the aim of efficient and effective law enforcement is likely to be recognised as a legitimate objective, the second, more difficult undertaking relates to whether the use of biased, error prone LFR technology is proportionate to this aim. Given that Contracting States’ margin of appreciation is narrower in cases involving so-called ‘suspect’ discrimination grounds, in which the category of race falls,[73] ECHR case law mandates that ‘very weighty reasons’ are required to justify why differential treatment appears both suited to and necessary in the realisation of a legitimate aim pursued.[74] Any putative gains in efficiency and so-called impartiality from the perspective of law enforcement agencies must, therefore, be balanced against the infringement upon discrimination rights and the plethora of other freedoms affected by dint of LFR technology.   The unique human rights impacts of LFR suggest that a restrictive approach should be adopted in such a proportionality assessment. As previously mentioned, the use of LFR technology in law enforcement contexts negatively affects the right to a private life due to the ‘capture and processing of biometric information without an individual’s consent’.[75] Deploying LFR technology in public places also has profound negative implications for the enjoyment of rights to freedom of expression and association. The ECtHR’s recent determination in Glukhin v. Russia is a valuable illustration to this effect.[76] In Glukhin , the Court determined that the conviction of a protestor for failing to notify Russian authorities of his intention to hold a solo demonstration, and the use of LFR technologies within this context, violated his rights to respect for his private life and freedom of expression, protected under Articles 8 and 10 of the ECHR respectively.[77]   Viewed in light of this catalogue of rights violations, the potential demographic biases in LFR technology ‘portend a strong foundation for further restricting how governments use’ such tools on indirect discrimination grounds.[78] Indeed, as previously stated, Article 2 of the CERD mandates States to nullify laws and regulations which have the effect of perpetuating racial discrimination.[79] General Recommendation No. 31 further provides that States must ‘implement national strategies or plans of action aimed at the elimination of structural racial discrimination’.[80] The significance of these provisions in relation to the governance of LFR is made clear by the absence of a legal framework in various jurisdictions that clearly define the use, regulation and oversight of such technology.[81] In the absence of targeted regulation, the increasing deployment of facial recognition technology in policing will only perpetuate existing societal divisions and erode confidence in the criminal justice system amongst minority ethnic communities.   8. Conclusion   Like the telescreens that captured Winston’s attention in the opening pages of 1984, the human rights impacts of LFR may be dimmed, but cannot be shut off completely. Taking stock of the positive IHRL obligations on States and the rights affected by indirect discrimination, this paper has suggested that the use of biased and error-ridden facial recognition technology is unlikely to be proportionate to a legitimate aim of effective law enforcement. Such practices should, in this author’s opinion, amount to impermissible indirect discrimination under the ECHR and under international law in general. Whilst this conclusion is necessarily qualified by the divergence in evidence on demographic bias, it recognises the possibility of technological advances either heightening or mitigating the risk of indirect discrimination in the deployment of LFR. This latent risk means that police forces making use of such technology ought to be alive to the prospect of racial profiling occurring and the possibility of trust amongst minority ethnic groups being further diminished. Udit Mahalingam Udit Mahalingam is a recent LLM graduate from the University of Cambridge. He is interested in civil liberties and human rights issues, particularly within the context of national security and law enforcement practices. [1] George Orwell, 1984 (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt 2013) 3-4. [2] Steven Morris, ‘Anger over use of facial recognition at South Wales football derby’ The Guardian (London, 12 January 2020) < https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/jan/12/anger-over-use-facial-recognition-south-wales-football-derby-cardiff-swansea > accessed 1 January 2024. [3] Zoe Tidman, ‘Metropolitan Police deploys facial recognition in central London with two hours’ warning’ The Independent (London, 20 February 2020) < https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/met-police-facial-recognition-technology-city-westminster-a9346831.html > accessed 1 January 2024. [4] Indeed, the use of LFR by law enforcement can be viewed as part of the broader phenomenon of so-called ‘predictive policing’. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, ‘Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion’ (2015) 13(2) Pa. L. Rev. 327. [5] Sam Shead, ‘“Orwellian” Surveillance Cameras Face Legal Battle’ ( Forbes , 25 July 2018) < https://www.forbes.com/sites/samshead/2018/07/25/orwellian-surveillance-cameras-face-legal-battle/?sh=433d578e1e39 > accessed 1 January 2024. [6] Matthew Ryder KC, ‘Independent legal review of the governance of biometric data in England and Wales’ (‘The Ryder Review’) ( Ada Lovelace Institute , June 2022) [1.3]. [7] Although the focus of the present article, policing is not the only area in which issues around the regulation of LFR arise—see Information Commissioner’s Office, ‘Information Commissioner’s Opinion: The Use of Live Facial Recognition Technology in Public Places’ (18 June 2021) < https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/2619985/ico-opinion-the-use-of-lfr-in-public-places-20210618.pdf > accessed 1 January 2024. [8] Ryan Calo, ‘Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw’ (2015) 103 Calif. L. Rev. 513, 549. [9] Ruth B Carter and Gary E Marchant, ‘Principles-Based Regulation and Emerging Technology’ in Gary E Marchant, Braden R Allenby and Joseph R Herket (eds), The Growing Gap Between Emerging Technologies and Legal-Ethical Oversight (Springer 2011) 165. [10] David R Johnson and David Post, ‘Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace’ (1996) 48 Stan L. Rev. 1367, 1367. [11] Calo (n 8) 552. [12] ibid 515. [13] Meg Leta Jones, ‘Does Technology Drive Law? The Dilemma of Technological Exceptionalism in Cyberlaw’ (2018) Journal of Law, Technology & Policy,   101, 101. [14] ibid 130. [15] Jack M Balkin, ‘The Path of Robotics Law’ (2015) 6 Cal L. Rev 45, 45. [16] ibid 45. [17] Lucas D Introna and Helen Nissenbaum, ‘Facial Recognition Technology A Survey of Policy and Implementation Issues’ 3 < https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1437730 > accessed 1 January 2024. [18] See, for example, Vera Lúcia Raposo, ‘The Use of Facial Recognition Technology by Law Enforcement in Europe: A Non-Orwellian Draft Proposal’ (2022) 29 European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 515; Diego Naranjo, ‘Your face rings a bell: How facial recognition poses a threat for human rights’ < https://repository.gchumanrights.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/61aa23ad-0262-4f46-bcfe-fc74a1d485f3/content > accessed 1 January 2024; Daragh Murray, ‘Facial recognition and the end of human rights as we know them?’ (2024) 4(2) Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights. [19] Qingxiu Bu, ‘The global governance on automated facial recognition (AFR): ethical and legal opportunities and privacy challenges’ (2021) 2 International Cybersecurity Law Rev 113, 116-118. [20] Amy K Lehr and William Crumpler, ‘The Impact of FRT Deployment on Human Rights’ in Facing the Risk: Part 2: Mapping the Human Rights Risks in the Deployment of Facial Recognition Technology  (Center for Strategic and International Studies 2021) 10 . [21] Discrimination issues arising from the use of LFR technology have, however, been considered in the context of federal laws and regulations in the United States—see, for example, Rachel S Fleischer, ‘Bias In, Bias Out: Why Legislation Placing Requirements on the Procurement of Commercialized Facial Recognition Technology Must Be Passed to Protect People of Color’ (2020) 50(1) Public Contract Law Journal 63. [22] Ben Bradford, Julia A Yesberg, Jonathan Jackson, and Paul Dawson, ‘Live Facial Recognition: Trust and Legitimacy as Predictors of Public Support for Police Use of New Technology’ (2020) 60(6) The British Journal of Criminology 1502, 1504. [23] Peter Fussey and Daragh Murray, ‘Independent Report on the London Metropolitan Police Service’s Trial of Live Facial Recognition Technology’, ( University of Essex Human Rights Centre , July 2019) < https://repository.essex.ac.uk/24946/1/London-Met-Police-Trial-of-Facial-Recognition-Tech-Report-2.pdf > accessed 1 January 2024. [24] ibid 19. [25] ibid 19. See also ‘Facing the Camera: Good Practice and Guidance for the Police Use of Overt Surveillance Camera Systems Incorporating Facial Recognition Technology to Locate Persons on a Watchlist, in Public Places in England & Wales’ ( Surveillance Camera Commissioner , November 2020) [3.42] < https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5fc75c5d8fa8f5474a9d3149/6.7024_SCC_Facial_recognition_report_v3_WEB.pdf > accessed 1 January 2024. [26] ibid 20. [27] ibid 19. [28] Kristine Hamman and Rachel Smith, ‘Facial Recognition Technology: Where Will It Take Us?’ ( Criminal Justice Magazine , 12 April 2019) < https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/resources/magazine/archive/facial-recognition-technology-where-will-it-take-us/ > accessed 1 January 2024. [29] Irena Nesterova, ‘Mass data gathering and surveillance: the fight against facial recognition technology in the globalized world’ (2020) 74 SHS Web Conf 2. [30]  R (Bridges) v Chief Constable of South Wales and Ors [2019] EWHC 2341 (Admin) [57]. [31] Patrick Grother, Mei Ngan, and Kayee Hanaoka, ‘Face Recognition Vendor Test (FRVT) Part 3: Demographic Effects’ ( National Institute of Standards and Technology , December 2019) < https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2019/nist.ir.8280.pdf > accessed 1 January 2024. [32] ibid 2. [33] Lindsey Barrett, ‘Ban facial recognition technologies for children-and for everyone else’ (2020) 26(2) Boston University Journal of Science and Technology Law. [34] Joe Purshouse and Liz Campbell, ‘Automated facial recognition and policing: A Bridge too far?’ (2021) 42 Legal Studies 209, 209. [35] Hans J. Morgenthau, ‘The Impartiality of the International Police’ (1968) 21(2) Revista Española de Derecho Internacional 267, 269. [36] ibid. [37] ibid. [38] ibid. [39] Grother, Ngan, and Hanaoka (n 31) 3. [40] ibid. [41] Kyriakos Kotsoglou and Marion Oswald, ‘The long arm of the algorithm? Automated Facial Recognition as evidence and trigger for police intervention’ (2020) 2 Forensic Sci Int Synergy 86, 87. [42] See, for example, Sir William Macpherson of Cluny, The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry: Report of an Inquiry (Cm 4262-I, 1999) [6.45]. [43] See, for example, Joel Miller, ‘Stop and Search in England: A Reformed Tactic or Business as Usual?’ (2010) 50(5) Brit. J. of Criminology 954, 954. [44] Robert Reiner, ‘Race and Criminal Justice’ (1989) 16(1) Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 5, 5. See also Julia A Yesberg, Arabella Kyprianides, Ben Bradford, Jenna Milani, Paul Quinton, and Oliver Clark-Darby, ‘Race and support for police use of force: findings from the UK’ (2022) 32(7) Policing and Society 878, 878. [45] Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A(III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), Art 2. [46] Intentional Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), Art. 1(a), 660 U.N.T.S 195 (1966). [47] ibid, Art. 2(a), Art. 2(c). [48] International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), UN GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, Art. 4(1). [49] ibid, Art. 19(3); Human Rights Committee (‘HRC’), General Comment No. 34, Freedoms of opinion and expression [21] (2011). [50] HRC, General Comment No. 18, Non-discrimination [1] (1989). [51] ibid. [52]  L.R. v. Slovakia, Communication No. 31/2003, Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination [10.4] (1996). [53] See, for example, Broeks v. The Netherlands , Communication No. 172/1984, Human Rights Committee, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2 [13]: ‘The right to equality before the law and to the equal protection of the law without any discrimination does not make all differences of treatment discriminatory. A differentiation based on reasonable and objective criteria does not amount to prohibited discrimination within the meaning of article 26.1’. [54] Open Society Justice Initiative, Addressing Ethnic Profiling in Policing  (Open Society Initiative 2009) 17. [55] Ben Bowling and Coretta Phillips, ‘Disproportionate and Discriminatory: Reviewing the Evidence on Police Stop and Search’ (2007) 70(6) MLR 936, 948. [56] Maria V. Morris, ‘Racial Profiling and International Human Rights Law: Illegal Discrimination in The United States’ (2001) 15 Emory Int’l L. Rev 207, 211. [57] Michael Shiner, Zoe Carre, Rebekah Delsol and Niamh Eastwood, ‘The Colour of Injustice: ‘Race’, drugs and law enforcement in England and Wales’ ( StopWatch , 14 October 2018) iv < https://www.stop-watch.org/what-we-do/research/the-colour-of-injustice-race-drugs-and-law-enforcement-in-england-and-wales/ > accessed 1 January 2024. [58] CERD (n 46), Preamble. [59] ibid, Art. 2(1)(a). [60] ibid, Art. 2(1)(c). [61] ‘General Recommendation No. 31, General Recommendation XXXI on the Prevention Of Racial Discrimination in the Administration and Functioning of the Criminal Justice System’ (Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 2005) 20. [62] General Recommendation No. 13, General Recommendation XIII on the Training of Law Enforcement Officials in the Protection of Human Rights’ (Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 1993) 2. [63] See, for example, the Court of Appeal’s observations in R (Bridges) v Chief Constable of South Wales and Ors [2020] EWCA Civ 1058 [199].   [64] Tony Mansfield, ‘Facial Recognition Technology in Law Enforcement Equitability Study: Final Report’ ( National Physical Laboratory , March 2023) < https://science.police.uk/site/assets/files/3396/frt-equitability-study_mar2023.pdf > accessed 1 January 2024. [65] ibid 4. [66]  Bridges (n 63) [201]. [67] Asress Adimi Gikay, ‘Regulating Use by Law Enforcement Authorities of Live Facial Recognition Technology in Public Spaces: An Incremental Approach’ (2023) 82(3) CLJ 414, 431. [68] The repression of the Uyghur community in Xianjiang represents one of the most notable instances of systematic LFR deployment and is illustrative of the technology’s wide-ranging human rights impacts. Indeed, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights have reported on the existence of ‘a sophisticated, large-scale and systematized surveillance system’ in Xinjiang that is ‘driven by an ever-present network of surveillance cameras, including deploying facial recognition capabilities’. See UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘OHCHR Assessment of Human Rights Concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, People’s Republic of China’ ( OHCHR , 31 August 2022) [96] < https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/2022-08-31/22-08-31-final-assesment.pdf > accessed 1 January 2024. [69] ‘General Recommendation No. 14, General Recommendation XIV on Article 1, Paragraph 1, of The Convention (Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 1993) 2. [70] See: European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Sept. 3, 1953, art. 14, 213 U.N.T.S 221. Article 14 of the ECHR is materially similar to the anti-discrimination provisions in the ICCPR and CERD. It provides that ‘the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status’. [71]  D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic , App. No. 57325/00, [44] (ECtHR. Feb. 7, 2006). [72]  Molla Sali v Greece , App no. 20452/14, [135] (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 9, 2018); Eweida & Others v United Kingdom , App nos. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 and 36516/10, [88] (ECtHR. Jan. 15, 2023). [73] For a comprehensive overview of the development of ‘suspect’ discrimination grounds in ECHR case law, see: Oddný Mjöll Arnardóttir, ‘The Differences that Make a Difference: Recent Developments on the Discrimination Grounds and the Margin of Appreciation under Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2014) 14(4) Hum. Rights Law Rev. 647, 649-652. [74] The ECtHR originally developed the ‘very weighty reasons’ test in cases involving sex or gender discrimination. See: Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v United Kingdom , App nos. 9214/80, 9473/81 and 9474/81 [78] (ECtHR, 28 May 1985). Even if not referring expressly to the ‘very weighty reasons’ test as such, the Court has reasoned that racial discrimination is ‘a particularly invidious kind of discrimination’, which ‘in view of its perilous consequences, requires from the authorities special vigilance and a vigorous reaction’: Timishev v. Russia , App nos. 55762/00 and 55974/00 (ECtHR, December 13, 2005) [56]. [75] Lehr and Crumpler (n 20) 10. [76]  Glukhin v. Russia, App   no. 11519/20 (ECtHR, 4 July 2023). [77] ibid [90]-[91] [78] Monika Zalnieriute , ‘Glukhin v. Russia App. No. 11519/20 Judgment’ (2023) 111(4) American Journal of International Law 695, 696. [79] CERD (n 46), Art 2(1)(c). [80] General Recommendation No. 31 (n 61), 5(i). [81] In 2022, the Ryder Review recommended, inter alia, that there was an ‘urgent need for a new, technologically neutral, statutory framework’ for the governance of biometric data in the United Kingdom. See Ryder (n 6) para 8.2. For a comprehensive overview of ‘potential legal and regulatory approaches in selected jurisdictions’ towards LFR governance, see Bu (n 19) 116.

This time, it feels like it is finally happening—until Abu Salah comes home with the dreaded news: ‘Wait another two days until the strong winds die down ’. Roliana cannot understand. ‘Daddy, why don’t we just take the airplane?’ she asks. [1]     I. Introduction   Seeking safety and entry into the territory of a state to initiate an asylum procedure, is often a life-risking and traumatising endeavour. Yet, thus far, the state parties to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951 Geneva Convention) including all member states of the European Union (EU) refuse to offer accessible safe passage.[2] The lack of sufficient humanitarian visas exacerbates the situation and forces refugees on perilous journeys across deserts, the sea, and violent borders.[3] Five-year old Roliana and her family fled from Aleppo, in 2012.[4] Part of the city was captured by rebels; regime forces subsequently dropped barrel bombs on densely populated urban areas.[5] Due to the escalating conflict, the family moved up north, towards Afrin, but the war caused water and electricity shortages, dysfunctional schools, and a lack of work.[6] The family decided to cross into Turkey, and eventually to Greece.   This is not a single story, the Syrian conflict has displaced over 12 million.[7] While the forced movement of refugees is one aspect of war and conflict, no conflict is waged without grave breaches of the laws of war, without violence against civilians. The barrel bomb attack on Aleppo by the Syrian regime as well as the indiscriminate shelling by Opposition groups as a response most likely constitute war crimes.[8] Those fleeing conflict zones and wars such as in Syria, like the family of Roliana, but also in Afghanistan, Eritrea, Ukraine, or Sudan, have often experienced these unimaginable crimes. They may have been victims and/or witnesses of war crimes, crimes against humanity or even genocide.   However, instead of issuing visas and thereby opening a safe route by air, the EU imposes sanctions on carriers such as airlines which forces people on dangerous journeys.[9] At Europe’s land borders, the search for a safe haven is answered with entry prevention measures and violence, a systematic practice depriving refugees of their right to seek asylum and freedom from harm that may itself amount to crimes against humanity.[10] Having fled the crimes in their home countries, asylum-seekers are likely to become victims of international crimes in transit again.   Disconnected Realities And yet, even upon arrival in states that provide access to regular asylum procedures, this essential part of a refugee’s experience—the manifest violations of human rights relevant under international criminal law (ICL) before and during the flight—remains outside the scope of the asylum process. The asylum procedure only aims to determine if the applicants meet the legal criteria according to the 1951 Geneva Convention. If so, beneficiaries of international protection are granted a respective residence permit as well as the 1951 Convention travel document .[11] The individual interest of many refugees to seek truth and justice for the harm suffered remains unaddressed in the asylum context.[12] It is only recognised in international treaties dealing with severe harm[13] and under the rules of international criminal law, above all, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC).[14]

‘Throughout history, it has been the inaction of those who could have acted; the indifference of those who should have known better; the silence of the voice of justice when it mattered most; that has made it possible for evil to triumph’. Haile Selassie, United Nations General Assembly, 4 October 1963.[1] Introduction The continuing suffering of the Sudanese people illustrates the futility of international policy-making in the absence of the political will necessary to enforce treaties. As worthy as conventions on human rights and genocide prevention are, without a robust enforcement architecture, the world’s dictators and war lords will continue to persecute and eliminate minority groups with impunity. In Sudan, the blame does not rest on the international community or the legacy of colonialism alone. Faced with human rights abuses, the African Union prioritises state sovereignty and leaders’ immunity from prosecution, and the Islamic world shows little concern for the systematic elimination of Muslims in Darfur. In addition, Khartoum skilfully manipulates American security concerns post-9/11, rendering humanitarian initiatives toothless. This article will draw on personal experience: interviewing survivors in Darfur in 2004, and founding Waging Peace, a charity supporting thousands of Sudanese refugees in the UK. Fig 1. The drawing shows Aishbarra village in Darfur, which was attacked by Janjaweed militia. Houses are set on fire by one of the attackers using a match. Villagers are shot and one person is shown with his left leg severed from the knee down. The villagers that were attacked are coloured in black pencil, while the attackers have lighter (orange) skin – showing the ethnic nature of the attacks (i.e. Arabs attacking ‘black Africans’ – in this case those from the Massaleit tribe). On the bottom right of the drawing are two young men, attached by the neck, led away by a Janjaweed fighter. These young men/boys could be taken into slavery, or may become child soldiers. The Islamist mission On 30 June 1989, the National Islamic Front (NIF) led by Field Marshall Omar Bashir overthrew the democratically elected government of Ja’afar Nimeiri, establishing the world’s second Islamist republic (after Iran). At the previous year’s election, the NIF polled less than 10%. Yet, Sudan specialist Gill Lusk says, the NIF secured power because its members had spent years rising through the ranks of Khartoum’s institutions, guided by their ideological leader, Hasan Turabi. ‘El Turabi and his colleagues had read their Lenin’, says Lusk. ‘The infiltration was patient and systematic and it included uncountable sleepers who revealed their beliefs after the 1989 coup’.[2]

The 2011 Western and Arab intervention in Libya was born of the lessons learned (or, as the case may be, not learned) from the international community’s previous two decades of responding to the outbreak of conflict and commission of gross violations of human rights in various contexts. More precisely, the Libyan case was informed by the international community’s previous failure to stop the horrific genocide in Rwanda and to halt what had been up to that point the largest mass killing on European soil, in Srebrenica, since the Second World War.   During those anxious months in the late winter and early spring of 2011 as observers watched events unfolding in Libya, these lessons ‘weighed heavily on the decision-makers in Washington, London, Paris and beyond’.[1] The world was monitoring a domestic Libyan uprising which was being met, particularly in the city of Benghazi, by the excessive use of force by units under the command of Muammar Qaddafi. The ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) doctrine was invoked by some international figures to push for the ultimate passage of UNSCR 1973 on the premise of preventing potential crimes against humanity and indeed the resolution contains language pertaining to R2P.[2] This UN resolution paved the way for the NATO and Arab intervention in Libya, which morphed from a protection mission to one of regime change, leading to Qaddafi’s downfall.   Ian Martin, the first UN Special Representative in Libya, in his meticulously documented book All Necessary Measures?  has detailed the initial international decisions taken on Libya in 2011-12. While questioning whether R2P indeed played a seminal role in international decision-making, Martin notes: ‘the Libya experience has done such damage to the limited international consensus there was around the R2P doctrine’.[3]   Whether or not R2P was central to the passage of UNSCR 1973, the lack of serious international investment in the Libya that emerged after Qaddafi regime’s demise was a singular failure on the part of the world’s leading powers especially given the legacy of Qaddafi’s four-decade plus quixotic, chaotic, and terrorizing reign. The international clarity and vision that were applied before the passage of UNSCR 1973 have seldom been in evidence since Qaddafi’s downfall.   As the world has turned its gaze away from Libya, Qaddafi’s successors have spent the past decade quarrelling—often violently—over the shallow legitimacy of the country’s institutions instead of working together to build a functioning state. As a consequence, the ordinary Libyan citizen has been left materially less secure and too often prey to abuse at the hands of the thugs (both home-grown and imported), while some of the victims of Qaddafi’s abuses themselves became victimizers.

Gaza: Can Anyone Hear Us?[1]   In a Washington Post  article published on 16 December 2023, the reporter David Ignatius wrote:   For three days this past week, I traveled the West Bank, from the arid hills below Hebron in the south to the chalky heights of Nablus in the north. What I saw was a pattern of Israeli domination and occasional abuse that makes daily life a humiliation for many Palestinians—and could obstruct the peaceful future that Israelis and Palestinians both say they want.  Driving the roads of the West Bank is—forgive the term—a ‘two-plate’ solution. Israeli settlers with yellow license plates zoom along on a well-guarded superhighway called Route 60. Palestinians with white plates navigate small, bumpy roads. Since Oct. 7, many of the entrances to their villages have often been closed. Traveling in an Israeli taxi with a Palestinian driver, I saw some of both worlds.  I watched backups at Israeli checkpoints near Bethlehem and Nablus that were over a half-mile long and could require waits of more than two hours. The delays, indignities and outright assaults on Palestinians have become a grim routine. ‘If I’m in a yellow-plate car, does that change my blood?’ asked Samer Shalabi, the Palestinian who was my guide in the Nablus area.  My tour of the West Bank was a reality check about what’s possible ‘the day after’ the Gaza war ends. President Biden and other world leaders speak hopefully about creating a Palestinian state once Hamas is defeated. I’d love to see that happen, too. But people need to get real about the obstacles that are in front of our eyes.[2]    I was struck by this piece of reporting—well-intentioned though it was—for the absence of context and history that it reveals. Is Mr. Ignatius only now discovering the occupation and its pernicious impact on Palestinian life, the relentless oppression waged against Palestinians over nearly six decades? Can he now, finally, begin to see the context that led to the current horrific loss of Palestinian and Israeli lives?   In the more than four months since the 7 October conflict erupted, Israel has dropped over 45,000 bombs on Gaza weighing more than 65,000 tons, which is equivalent to three atomic bombs like those dropped on Hiroshima. This has resulted in a level of destruction that is ‘comparable in scale to the most devastating urban warfare in the modern period’, comparable to the bombing of Dresden during the second world war. According to Robert Pape, a University of Chicago political scientist, ‘the word “Gaza” is going to go down in history along with Dresden and other famous cities that have been bombed. What you’re seeing in Gaza is in the top 25% of the most intense punishment campaigns in history’.[3]   Between 7 October 2023 and 19 February 2024, over 29,092 Palestinians have been killed (approximately 70 percent are women and children), 69,028 injured (or 3.0 percent of Gaza’s population) and 1.7 million (out of 2.3 million or 74 percent) have been internally displaced. During the same period, there have been over 1200 Israelis killed (including foreign nationals), approximately 5,400 injured and 134 remain hostage in Gaza.[4] Conservatively, between 29-37 percent of all buildings have been damaged or destroyed[5] including over 60 percent of Gaza’s homes (over 70,000 destroyed or made uninhabitable and over 290,000 damaged) in addition to apartment buildings, water and sanitation infrastructure, factories, businesses hotels, shopping malls, theaters, mosques, and churches. Approximately 92 percent of all school buildings have been damaged (in addition to 392 educational facilities) or are used as shelters. All of Gaza’s universities have been damaged or destroyed and are no longer operational. Similarly, the number of functioning hospitals has dropped from 36 to 14 (11 are partially functional and three are running at minimal capacity).[6] By the second half of November, the World Bank estimated that ‘60 percent of Gaza’s ICT, health and education infrastructure had been destroyed [and] 70 percent of its commerce-related infrastructure’, resulting in an unemployment rate of 85 percent (given the closure of 56,000 businesses and a loss of 147,000 formal sector jobs).[7]   The northern Gaza Strip has no access to clean water and the south receives a meager water supply from one pipeline coming from Israel. By 2 January, there was a full electricity blackout throughout the Gaza Strip, which has continued.[8] The systematic destruction of Gaza’s infrastructure has led to the ‘rapid spread of infectious disease’.[9] Consequently, the World Health Organization warns that the outbreak of disease could ultimately kill more Palestinians than Israeli bombs.[10] According to Professor Devi Sridhar, the chair of global public health at the University of Edinburgh, ‘A quarter of [Gaza’s] population could die within a year due to outbreaks of disease caused by this unprecedented conflict’[11] where ‘indirect health related deaths…can outnumber direct deaths by more than 15 to 1’.[12]

Introduction   The epitome of the 21st century’s Russian war against Ukraine manifested itself in Vladimir Putin’s speech on the morning of 24 February 2022.[1] In his address, the Russian President announced a series of wars against the collective West and the sovereign state of Ukraine. The massive Russian military attack on Ukrainian land, air, and sea was presented to the Russian public as ‘a special military operation’. According to President Putin, ‘The purpose of this operation was to protect people who, for eight years now, have been facing humiliation and genocide perpetrated by the Kiev regime. To this end, we will seek to demilitarize and denazify Ukraine, as well as bring to trial those who perpetrated numerous bloody crimes against civilians, including against citizens of the Russian Federation’. Putin’s bold statement was uttered notwithstanding the facts that, during those eight years, Russia had annexed Crimea and effectively occupied Donbass, two Eastern regions of Ukraine.[2] The Russian government machine failed, however, to gain control over the Ukrainian government and the Ukrainian people beyond the occupation borders.[3]   Arguably, the full-scale Russian invasion, accompanied by an overwhelming scale of atrocious crimes against the Ukrainian nation, creates a ‘context of a manifest pattern of similar conduct directed against’ the Ukrainian nation to destroy it as such, in whole or in part, within the meaning of the crime of genocide.[4] The thesis of this essay is that such a manifest pattern includes a crime that could itself affect such destruction ie the forcible transfer of children of the group to another group (from Ukraine to Russia or Russian-controlled territory).   It is uncontested that since 2014, and later, after February 2023 on a larger scale, a substantial number of Ukrainian children have been transferred, under the control of the Russian authorities, from their homes or places of residence to the territory of the Russian Federation or to the Ukrainian regions under Russian occupation.[5] Based on an analysis of Russian law and the reports of public officials in the field of education and children’s rights, the necessary conclusion is that all such acts were carried out by the state’s centralized system of governance under the control and leadership of President Putin. It is posited that such actions reflect the intent to destroy the nation of Ukraine and eliminate its identity as a separate entity from Russia.   On 17 March 2023, the Pre-Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Mr Vladimir Putin and Ms Maria Lvova-Belova, Commissioner for Children’s Rights in the Office of the President of the Russian Federation. They both are allegedly responsible for ‘the war crime of unlawful deportation of the population (children) and that of unlawful transfer of the population (children) from occupied areas of Ukraine to the Russian Federation (under articles 8(2)(a)(vii) and 8(2)(b)(viii) of the Rome Statute)’.[6]

Bo Kyi is a Burmese human rights activist and founder of the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP), a human rights organization that advocates for the release of political prisoners in Burma and works to document prison conditions, unlawful arrests, and detention-related abuses carried out by the Burmese government. The AAPP also provides humanitarian assistance and other support to current and former political prisoners and their families. Bo Kyi is a former political prisoner due to to his participation in pro-democracy protests during the 1988 uprising. Assistance Association for Political Prisoners Assistance Association for Political Prisoners.   CJLPA : Can you tell us about your first interactions with politics during the 1988 student movement and what made you want to get involved with anti-government protests?   Bo Kyi : I was born in a country where fear was pervasive. We feared imprisonment, there was a fear of being tortured, losing a loved one or home, a fear of losing your dignity, a fear of poverty and forced labor. The military dictatorship began in 1962, three years before I was born. But by the time I was a teenager I already understood that our university students had long been at the heart of political movements in Burma, since before colonial independence.   In 1988, I was a final year student at Rangoon Arts and Sciences University, majoring in Burmese literature. In that time, there was not a multi-political party system, only one military-aligned party called the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP). We were taught political science in university, but it was the ‘Burmese Way to Socialism’ with no space for criticism. We were told to just listen and memorize what was taught. Students had not been allowed to establish student unions since 7 July 1962, when military soldiers infamously blew up a Rangoon student union with dynamite. Thereafter, all students’ unions were declared illegal, students were forced to join the BSPP for a chance to gain further study, everything was controlled by the Party. I had never heard of democracy or human rights. In university, we had to learn what happened in the past by listening to our elders in secret. Professors and tutors taught us the history of the student movement in Burma, and the role that it played before, in colonial times.   My father was a soldier in the Air Force, and he raised me as if I was a soldier, not allowing any question back. If I asked questions, he beat me. When I was young, I had a great fear of my father. But as I got older and older, I tried to look for ways to free myself from my father. This is why I worked hard to get good grades at high school and go to university. Such kinds of emotions would lead me to join the struggle.   On 22 September 1987, the military government led by General Ne Win announced demonetization of the national currency, the Kyat. The decision rendered the existing banknotes of 1, 5, 10, and 20 kyats invalid. The purported aim of the demonetization was to curb black market activities and reduce corruption, but everyone knew it was led by the senior generals’ superstition. Most of the population faced challenges in exchanging their old currency for the new notes, so many people simply lost their entire savings and what little wealth they had.   As students, we financially relied on our parents as they supported us through our studies. When they suffered, we also suffered. This dissatisfaction with the economic situation soon boiled over into rage at the injustice of dictatorial military rule.

Moral considerations in confiscating Russian assets Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine has been going on for almost two years. During this time, Russia has committed brutal crimes against Ukrainians, which were witnessed by the international community. In February 2023, the UN General Assembly demanded that Russia stop the war and immediately withdraw its army from Ukraine.[1] In March 2023, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin, accusing him of being responsible for the illegal deportation of children from Ukraine, which constitutes a war crime.[2] While Ukraine is fighting for its freedom and awaiting fair adjudication of crimes committed during this bloody war, the material losses of the Ukrainian state are growing.   According to the World Bank, the losses caused by the aggressor amount to more than 400 billion euros on the controlled territory alone, and after the liberation of the entire territory of Ukraine from the invaders, this amount might double.[3] Ukraine’s economy currently functions at the expense of macro-financial assistance from partners, but Russia must pay for the damage it caused to peaceful Ukrainians.   Voluntary compensation by the aggressor country is unlikely. A more practical solution is to confiscate the assets of Russia as a state, as well as its citizens and companies that support the Putin regime. However, prior to the full-scale invasion, there were no universal approaches to the confiscation of assets of the aggressor state with the possible aim of transferring them to the state affected by the aggression while the war was ongoing.   Historically, compensation for war losses was conducted mostly at the expense of state funds on the basis of treaties or other international acts. In most cases, the aggressor state must agree to pay compensation under such treaties, since they are typically negotiated and require the consent of all parties involved. However, there are some scenarios in which compensation may be determined without the direct agreement of the aggressor state:   Imposed reparations: in certain situations, the victorious parties in a conflict may impose reparations on the aggressor state as part of the peace settlement, as after World War I with the Treaty of Versailles.[4] These imposed reparations are often outlined in a treaty or agreement. The aggressor state may be required to accept these terms as a condition for the cessation of hostilities and the restoration of peace.

Over his career, Kevin Macdonald has directed a plethora of documentaries and films which have garnered critical acclaim and popular success. Not one to shy away from sensitive and complex subject matter, Kevin’s work depicts unsanitised, thought-provoking stories, from a documentary on antisemitism to a film on a prisoner in Guantanamo. For the former, Kevin was awarded an Academy Award for Best Documentary feature. His latest film, The Mauritanian , explores the real story of Mohamedou Ould Slahi, a man imprisoned by the US government in Guantanamo and charged with organizing the 9/11 attacks. The film follows civil rights lawyer Nancy Hollander, marine prosecutor Steve Crouch, and the alleged terrorist Mohamedou himself. Featuring a star studded cast of Benedict Cumberbatch, Jodie Foster, and Tahar Rahim, the film intricately weaves complex themes such as the rule of law to make a compelling legal drama. CJLPA : Before we delve into the film The Mauritanian , we wanted to know what impact the film had had on Mohamedou Ould Slahi’s life and how life has been for him since the film came out.   Kevin Macdonald : I spoke to him recently. He is doing well. He still runs into difficulties with certain countries. They still won’t let him into Germany which is where he was living before he was arrested. He’s a sensitive soul and finds it really upsetting.   One of the things that’s remarkable to me is that he is not more embittered. He wants to be positive, do positive things and not regret all the time he lost. This is in the context of his mother dying whilst he was in prison [Guantanamo]. He is also incredibly forgiving. So for him to be faced with these accusations, which are almost certainly orchestrated to some degree by embarrassed individuals in the security services, is awful. I was told that this was the case by the German ambassador to Mauritania, who became a very good friend of Mohamedou’s. The German ambassador said that there were people in the BND who act hand in glove. These people don’t want to admit they were wrong [about Mohamedou]. They would rather just keep on besmirching his reputation.   CJLPA : Subsequent to the film coming out, Mohamedou has given talks at eminent institutions such as the Cambridge Union. How has he found speaking publicly on his time in Guantanamo?   KM : He is willing to talk about it but finds it really hard. There is a lot of trauma that gets brought up during the talks. After those sorts of talks, he has to recover. It takes him several days after each time to recover because he’s reliving the trauma each time. He wants to tell people but at the same time it affects him. When he came and stayed in my house, he liked spending a lot of time in his room. I don’t know much about prisoner psychology, but he likes to be in a small, controlled environment.   CJLPA : You now know him very well. How did you first come across Mohamedou’s story?   KM : I had actually read some of his book [ Guantanamo Diary ] when it came out it. I never thought of making a film about it until Benedict Cumberbatch’s production company got in touch with me and asked me whether I would be interested in being involved. I was not sure if there was anything more to say about the war on terror. The production company told me to just talk to Mohamedou. I spoke to him and it was his personality, wit, and warmth that really astonished me and I thought, I want to make a film about this character. I’m not a politician. I’m not a lawyer. I’m a filmmaker interested in stories and characters.   I just thought he was an extraordinary character who needed to be better known. I wanted to try and tell the story of Guantanamo in a way that really affects a wide audience that isn’t just preaching to the converted. The problem with a lot of human rights films and documentaries is that they are seen and admired by people who already agree with what is in them. We felt that we wanted to make a film that tried to reach both sides of the American political divide, to show that the justice that was served to Mohamedou was a travesty and that he was mistreated by the system. If you can move people to empathy, you can change their mind. You can make them understand the legal aspects of his case but in a simple but emotional way.

1. The Obligation to Undress and the Destruction of Personal Property: Related Violations   1.1. Evidence of Confiscation and Destruction of Migrants’ Personal Belongings Denounced by International Organisations, Bodies, and Non-Governmental Organisations   The requirements for migrants to undress and the destruction of their personal belongings—including documents and mobile phones—by border guards and Frontex [the European Border and Coast Guard Agency] agents, at both internal and external borders of the EU, has been a subject of reporting and condemnation by various international organisations and institutions for several years.   The Fundamental Rights Agency of the European Union (FRA), in its 2020 report on the external borders of the EU, exposed severe violations of migrants’ human rights, including the confiscation and arbitrary destruction of personal effects. The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) has also repeatedly condemned the seizure and destruction of personal belongings of individuals forcibly returned from Greece to Turkey.[1]   The report titled ‘Beaten, Punished, and Pushed Back’ by the Protecting Rights at Borders (PRAB) network, published in January 2023, reveals that the people fleeing persecution or serious harm and in search of protection, attempting to enter the EU via the Bosnian-Croatian border over the past years, have faced denial of access to asylum procedures, arbitrary arrest or detention, physical abuse or mistreatment, and theft or destruction of property.[2] In a testimony of July 2022 provided by two individuals from Bangladesh, it was stated:   We continued walking through Croatia and at around four in the afternoon, we descended from one hill towards a water stream. That is when we heard dogs barking nearby […] and then silence […] so, we drank water and refreshed. After five minutes, we heard and noticed a drone flying above us, and then almost immediately some 20-30 police officers surrounded us. They caught all 16 of us, no one escaped, and not anyone even tried to. […] They asked if we had phones, power banks, money, or anything in our possession. We had to put everything in a bag, and another row of police searched us and took anything that they would find, even lighters or paper bags. […] We asked for water and for our phones, but they refused to give them to us.[3]   Furthermore, the report highlights that the destruction of personal belongings, particularly telephones and SIM cards, is also occurring at the Polish-Belarusian border. The refugees faced robbery by Belarusian border officials as well. These persistent abuses have been extensively documented in a policy note published in December 2021 by the PRAB network. The note asserts that the confiscation and destruction of migrants’ documents and personal property at European borders serve dual motivation (‘ensuring evidence is destroyed, and lucrative purposes’) and takes different forms. As the note states:

Eric Emeraux is the former Head of the Central Office for Combating Core International Crimes and Hate Crimes (OCLCH), France’s war crimes unit. Prior to that, Emeraux spent five years in Sarajevo as internal security attaché at the French Embassy. His book Hunting Monsters , published in 2023 in the UK, recounts the considerable work achieved with his team to track down war criminals and put an end to impunity. This written interview was conducted in December 2023.   CJLPA : During the five years you spent in Sarajevo as internal security attaché at the French Embassy, you were confronted with the horrors of genocidal wars. What were the most significant challenges you encountered in this position? What impact did this position have on the rest of your career?   Eric Emeraux : I was previously specialised in the fight against organised crime and homicide. It was mainly in this area that I worked in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Being an internal security attaché is an exciting and demanding job. You need a lot of interpersonal skills and humility to get different countries to cooperate and find innovative solutions to combat insecurity. Most of the time, cooperation is simply a matter of interpersonal relations between men and women who are willing to work together, sometimes behind the backs of their administrations. In the end, the fight against arms trafficking, human trafficking, and the fight against terrorism, particularly after 2015 and the wave of attacks that France experienced, were the greatest challenges during these five years.   But it’s also true that my assignment in this country made me aware of the impact and effects of war on people’s minds and souls. My daily life was surrounded by the horror stories that punctuated these wars. They concerned all the parties involved, dividing families, stigmatising them and leaving indelible marks, especially when justice was not served. By closely analysing certain situations, I realised how fragile human beings are because they are easily influenced, and that in the end, it’s not that complicated to turn an ordinary person into an ordinary killer.   CJLPA :   In 2017, you were appointed Head of the Central Office for Combating Core International Crimes and Hate Crimes (OCLCH). Could you briefly explain the reasons that led to the creation of this body and tell us what motivated you to work on tracking down war criminals?   EE : This office was created in 2013 as a continuation of the specialised unit of magistrates set up in 2012. As France had signed and ratified the Rome Statute, we had an obligation to try any perpetrators who may be hiding in France, in addition to the work carried out by the International Criminal Court. There are therefore two coexisting systems, one national and the other international, which implement the principles of international justice.